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INTRODUCTION

It has become commonplace among labor law academics to view
the National Labor Relations Act,1 also known as the Wagner Act, as
both a watershed change in labor relations law and one of the most
* Editor's Note: This interview took place on the 2d and 3d of March 1986 between
ProfessorKenneth M, Casebeer and Leon H. Keyserling, former Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers under President Truman from 1950 to 1953, member of the Councilfrom
1947 to 1950, and legislative aide to Senator Robert F Wagner from 1933 to 1938. Mr.
Keyserling was actively involved in Democratic economic policy, legal practice, and consulting
until his death on August 9, 1987.
The interview that follows is more of a conversation than either an oral history or an
interview about historical events. It is not, however, a verbatim account of the conversation
between Professor Casebeerand Mr. Keyserling. The Review undertook minor stylistic editing
of the transcript,and placed certain parentheticalremarks made by Mr. Keyserling in footnotes.
** Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. The interviewer would like to
thank Michael Fischl for helpful comments. This work is dedicated to the memory of Leon
Keyserling.
1. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 &
Supp. 11 1984)).
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radical legislative initiatives in American history. It may be both.2
At the same time, disputes have increased in number and intensity as
to the exact meaning of the legal transformation brought about by the
Act. The dominant paradigm describes a legal regime of state intervention into private labor relations in order to structure, or for some
to impose, private governance procedures. The resulting structure of
labor relations channels conflict into manageable forms, thereby
dampening larger scale, more destabilizing threats to industrial
peace.' Others see the Act less as an instrument of governmental
intervention and more as the legalization and formalization of the previously existing, economically based, institutional practices of labor
and management. Legalization of these practices in turn reflects and
shapes pluralistic group interests.4 Critics of both of these views see a
more indeterminate, open-ended restructuring of bargaining power
and bargaining forms. The generality of the Act's protection of labor
practices has allowed-perhaps contrary to legislative intent-conservative judicial and National Labor Relations Board constructions
of the law, 5 which ultimately have reduced the economic power of
labor. Both the strength of bargaining power and the topics suitable
for bargaining were sacrificed. 6 Some commentators have discovered
exemplars of state power that are more general than a labor relations
policy: alternatively, a codification of class relations7 or an inefficient
2. See, e.g., St. Antoine, The Wagner Act: Labor Law's Signal Event, 64 MICH. B.J. 121
(1985).
3. See, e.g., Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1947); Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CALIF. L. REV. 663, 817 (1973); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68
HARV. L. REV. 999, 999-1002 (1955). These authors offer analyses of the postwar legal regime
inaugurated by the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act. See infra notes 4-8. To the
extent that these amendments created a successor regime, it is nonetheless an indication of the
lasting transformative impact of the original Act. Furthermore, to the extent that many of the
assumptions used by each analysis generally could be read into an interpretation of the Wagner
Act, it is simply the specific legal issue contexts that are different for each author. For a
critique of postwar labor law, see Stone, The Post- War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90
YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Finkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REv. 23, 55-63 (1984).
5. Klare, Judicial Deradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268-69, 280 (1978).
6. C. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS 199, 241-43 (1985); Klare, supra note 5,
at 292-93; Tomlins, The New Deal, Collective Bargaining, and the Triumph of Industrial
Pluralism, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 19, 29-34 (1985).
7. See, e.g., Block & Hirschhorn, New Productive Forces and the Contradiction of
Contemporary Capitalism: A Post-Industrial Perspective, 7 THEORY & SoC'' 363 (1979); J.
Rogers, Divide and Conquer: The Legal Foundations of Postwar U.S. Labor Policy (doctoral
dissertation, Princeton University, 1984).
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regulatory interference with market mechanisms.' Despite the divergent views of all the commentators, they agree that the degree of radical change attributable to the Act centers on the legitimation of
labor's collective power in the relations of production.
Scholars outside of legal academics take a broader view of the
Act's policies, tending to locate the origin and meaning of its provisions in the historical context of the legislation, 9 the administration,' 0
and the political and legal culture"I of the New Deal. The Act is still
thought to embody a labor policy, but one designed to provide an
administrative lever that would remove or ameliorate threats to stable
production and enhance the countervailing power of labor in the
aggregate. New economic power would redistribute a portion of the
wage bargain that had been further slanted toward increasing profits
as a result of economic depression. Under these views, a particular
labor policy might have been considered controversial, but its appearance was neither surprising nor incompatible with the loose new political deal that was shaping governmental institutions and policies.
The idea of the Wagner Act was exceptional, though not simply
in the labor relations sense or in the political odds of its passage. For
a brief moment in history, an idea and a movement appeared that had
the potential to redirect American political life, but which now seem
lost in the various representations of the legal regime. An emphasis
on state planning is missing in both the legal history of labor relations
and the institutional history of economic recovery. The thesis offered
in this interview does not deny that both significant interventions in
the rights and duties of labor and management, and state-supported
countervailing power for labor against management, figured prominently within the conceptual framework of the Act. Rather, the suggestion is that since its passage, the roads taken in labor relations law,
the difference in labor politics as it develops in the United States, and
the perception of unhealthy trends in income distribution all have
been affected by a failure to embrace an ideal of public and private
interdependence of economic power and social planning. This interdependence was not only conceivable in the mid-1930's, but in fact
formed the intellectual commitment behind the Act. Even so, the
8. See, e.g., Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal
Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983).
9. For the most thorough legislative political history of the Act, see I. BERNSTEIN, THE
NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY (1950).

10. See, e.g., J. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(Vol. 1 1974).
11. See, e.g., P. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982).
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draftsmen clouded any clear case to be made, vacillating on their willingness to embrace this thinking fully.
While it may be argued that the draftsman's intent, as opposed to
12
the legislature's intent-the latter with its own controversies _
should play only a small role in statutory interpretation, the recollections of those who created the events certainly pose questions of history that cannot be ignored. While the holder of the drafting pen may
be filtering culture, politics, shortrun concerns, and many other forces
that are dwarfed by subsequent personal and social history, certainly
the same potential distortions affect present-day representations of
legislative text and political discourse, including those of the previously characterized scholars.
Thus Leon Keyserling's thoughts on the Wagner Act have
importance beyond the mere fact of his drafting. The hypothesis that
emerged and was explored in the conversation with him strongly suggests a broader context for interpreting the intent and design of the
Act-placing it more than labor law scholars would in the context of
the early New Deal and the National Industrial Recovery Act 3
mentality, and placing it more than historians would in the vanguard
of progressive state responses to the reality of a changing world.t 4
However much critics of the Act saw the proposal through their own
agendas, and whatever compromises were forced during two legislative sessions, the drafters believed in democratic and centralized economic planning.'" Central planning in the early 1930's, it should be
12. See Gudridge, Legislation in Legal Imagination: Introductory Exercises, 37 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 493, 545-46 (1983).
13. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (amended by ch. 246, 49 Stat. 375 (1935)), repealedby Pub.
L. No. 89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 648 (1966).
14. Finegold & Skocpol, State, Party, and Industry: From Business Recovery to the
Wagner Act in America's New Deal, in STATEMAKING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 159 (C.
Bright & S. Harding eds. 1984).
In introducing the 1935 bill, Senator Wagner connected the purpose of the NLRA to
section 7(a) of the NIRA, and asserted an independent interest in redistribution:
In addition, there was a second phase of the program which struck at the
very core of the depression. Congress determined to fix wages and hours at a
level that might, by reemployment and higher pay, spread adequate purchasing
power among the masses of consumers and thus prime the pump of business.
Equally in the foreground was the intent to insure a decent measure of security
and comfort to those who worked, while protecting the fair-minded employer
from the cutthroat tactics of the exploiting few.
79 CONG. REC. 7567-68 (1935).
15. See, e.g., 81 CONG. REC. 2939 (1937) (speech by Senator Wagner entitled, Industrial
Democracy and IndustrialPeace) [hereinafter Wagner, Industrial Democracy and Industrial
Peace]; J. HUTHMACHER, SENATOR ROBERT F. WAGNER AND THE RISE OF URBAN
LIBERALISM 135-36, 156 (1968); C. TOMLINS, supra note 6, at 104; Wagner, Planning in Place
of Restraint, 22 SURV. GRAPHIC 395 (1933); see also infra p. 317 (argument for government's
responsibility to solve social dislocation and aid the disadvantaged). For a discussion positing
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noted, did not anticipate the increase in administrative bureaucracy.
It was then a notion of planning to structure basic roles in social relations and provide a public infrastructure to facilitate stable development and social justice. Today, planning seems to signify direct
supervision of specific parties whenever government perceives skewing of their previously entitled Coasian bargaining rights or disapproves of the consequences of acting on them. In the WagnerKeyserling view, the modern public-private distinction, thought to be
a pluralistic, liberal advance of constitutional thinking, subordinating
private interest to a separate, legislatively defined public good, may be
seen rather as a conservative retreat from private power derived from
a recognition of the interdependence of private and public power.
Replacing the negatively defined, hands-off philosophy of freedom of
contract combined with a laissez-faire state-a private-public unitywith the positive planning of freedom of organization and a redistributive welfare state-a public-private unity-represented a conceptually clearer connection to prior constitutional law. At the same
time, it stood for a more radical role for the state than the commonly
heralded new constitutional order prevailing from 1937 to the present.
Such a comprehensive change in the articulated relationship of political institutions and civil society required not only a labor policy in
general, but also a specific labor policy of organization for the 1930's.
This policy, intended to resolve the crisis of underconsumption,
would also be compatible with general and long-term economic stabilization. Since the AFL and organized labor simply wanted government backing for further organization, their willingness to cede the
specifics to Senator Wagner permitted his office to set the rights of
labor in a broader economic vision-a vision of governmentally
directed labor policy as one aspect of social security and progress.
This interview, therefore, intervenes in the current debate about the
relationship between the Act and both the political organization of
subsequent labor relations and the development, or lack of developthat the intent was less of a progressive response than simply the traditional response of the
state to economic crises, see J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR
LAW

(1983). Professor Atleson noted that:
A seemingly more helpful analysis might be that in times of crisis the state
tends to act to stabilize or rationalize capitalism through an expansion of state
power despite the opposition of business. Concessions may be granted to
workers, but only in ways that can concurrently increase the power of the state as
well. Pressure from below combines with a desire to increase the institutional
power of the state at crisis times, and, concurrently, such crises weaken the
power of capital to block change.

Id. at 43 (footnote omitted).

290
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ment, of broader labor politics in this country. 6
Contrary to the subsequent emphasis on "labor relations,"
"rights," and "duties," or on the countervailing power of pluralistic
interests, the Keyserling interview suggests that the content of the Act
turned on three more general principles. Although each of these principles is independently important, the first lexically encompasses the
other two. First, the major innovation of the Act, most clearly articulated in the preamble, described an entirely restructured vision of constitutional democracy in the express linkage between congressional
power and individual entitlement.'" Congress inevitably exercised
central planning responsibility under the commerce clause18 to regulate by action or inaction all economic exchanges that affect the health
of a national economic system. Due process reflected the political
duty to look behind the purely formal equality represented by "liberty
of contract," in order to recognize the role that the state played in
preserving inequalities of bargaining power. While creating no affirmative duties on government, legislation that addressed the consequences to individuals of the government's inevitable role in
fomenting present economic conditions and enforcing accumulated
powers based on expectations of such intervention, would certainly
not violate due process. Inequality of bargaining power itself skewed
supply and demand to the detriment of the legitimate public policy
interest in economic recovery for all. Thus, redressing the distortions
and injustices of economic behavior in part caused by past state action
must be both legitimate and within congressional authority.' 9
16. For a discussion of "American exceptionalism," see J. Rogers, supra note 7.
17. An express conceptual linkage of public power limits and the definition of private,
individual, and constitutional rights can of course be negative or positive. One could argue
that the dying constitutional vision of the Supreme Court in the 1930's applied the directindirect effects test of United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1894), to prevent federal
legislative powers from reaching employment relations, because public power must be defined
to serve the laissez-faire freedom of contract defined by due process protections of liberty. All
public power is, therefore, derivative of private rights in a private-public unity. For a view of
the continuity of pre- and post-1937 constitutional law and its relation to the so-called private
law of employment contracts, see Casebeer, Teaching an Old Dog Old Tricks." Coppage v.
Kansas and At-Will Employment Revisited, 6 CARDOZo L. REV. 765 (1985).
18. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. In upholding the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), Chief Justice Hughes correctly construed the
statute's scope of constitutional power, although on narrower grounds than the full economic
recovery rationale of the Wagner Act. The preamble to the final version reads:
The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to
strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the
efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b)
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Second, the draftsman's conception of state-supported bargaining
power functioned primarily to redistribute wealth in order to attack
the problem of underconsumption. This legitimation of bargaining
power would be accomplished by enforceable recognition of bargaining units and duties to bargain, prohibition of sham bargaining by
company unions, and definition of asymmetrical and general unfair
labor practices of management, but not of labor. At the same time, it
would attack the reduced production that accompanied recognition
strikes. The prohibitions of unfair labor practices were mainly aimed
at setting the bargaining process in motion by eliminating these
strikes, which were responsible for the most intense and bitter labor
occurring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or
controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from
or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in
commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such volume
as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into
the channels of commerce.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment,
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of
differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring
equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372 § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
For one of the few commentaries to approach connecting the Act's preamble with a
macroeconomic recovery policy as the conceptual framework for the Act, see Mitchell, Infialion, Unemployment, and the Wagner Act: A Critical Reappraisal, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1065
(1986). Professor Mitchell noted that:
Though the statement in the preamble appears clear, it is not conclusive
proof that the Wagner Act was originally viewed as an instrument of economic
policy. Its inclusion was possibly no more than a means of convincing the
Supreme Court that the law involved interstate commerce. The Act's predecessor, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 ... had been declared unconstitutional only months before the Wagner Act was adopted. Perhaps the
preamble-with its reference to burdening the flow of commerce-was simply a
ploy to convince the Court that Congress had the authority to pass such a law.
But while the constitutionality issue may have been a contributing factor to the
language, the history of the Wagner Act suggests that the preamble also embodied a then-popular theory of economic depressions.
Id. at 1067 (footnotes omitted); see Atleson, supra note 15, at 41; Renshaw, Organised Labour
and the Keynesian Revolution, in NOTHING ELSE TO FEAR: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
AMERICA IN THE THIRTIES

223-24 (S. Baskerville & R. Willett eds. 1985).
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strife during the early stages of the Depression. In addition to state
recognition of the legitimacy of independent unions, the elimination
of company unions coupled with the economic weapons that were still
available to unions, such as secondary boycotts and changes in cargo
handling, created a set of economic disincentives that employers
could not ignore. Labor Board certification of bargaining units could
help ensure the strength of counterorganization, which could then
deliver substantial redistribution of the wage bargain.2 °
Third, failures to enforce earlier guarantees of free collective bargaining under the National Industrial Recovery Act, as well as ad hoc
measures undertaken through Executive orders and the Resolution 44
Board,2 1 inevitably led the draftsmen toward an independent agency
with self-contained enforcement capacity and authority. The Board
would be actively involved in ensuring bargaining, and would thus be
more than a passive factfinder or a preliminary stage in the enforcement of generic rights open to compromise or purchase. This agency
would be modeled after the state-of-the-art Federal Trade Commission, 22 and wol
would include minor procedural modifications drawn from
the Railway Labor Act.2 3
20. Distribution concerned the draftsmen more than jurisdictional lines:
The supporters of [the 1934 version of the Wagner Act, known as the Labor
Disputes Act], therefore, were proposing a course qualitatively different from
that suggested by previous advocacy of collective bargaining. Their intention
was to give unambiguous public support to independent unionism as a means to
promote collective bargaining, not in the interest of stabilizing relations between
existing organized parties-the rationale of previous legislation-but in
vindication of the tangible public interest in the stabilization of the wages, hours
and working conditions of the labor force at large. From this flowed the two
most important features of the bill; first, its critique of company unionism; and
second, its proposal to place authority to determine the appropriate dimensions
of a collective bargaining relationships [sic] in the hands of the Board.
C. ToMLINS, supra note 6, at 122; see Finegold & Skocpol, supra note 14, at 182.
Subsequently, much of the economic power of unions has been restricted by Taft-Hartley
and Court decisions. Whether a top-down organizational strategy of virtually all industry
would have eventually succeeded with such weapons as widespread boycotts and other economic pressures, and whether such organization would have changed the macroeconomic record, is something which remains theoretical. Compare Mitchell, supra note 19, at 1068
(skeptical about a Keynesian wage-push approach to economic recovery, favoring supply side
approaches), with J. HUTHMACHER, supra note 15, at 158-59 (approving of the demand
approach of the Wagner Act). For an analysis of the economic effects of unions, given the
change in the basic labor statutes, see R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do?
(1984).
21. For detailed descriptions of these agencies, see I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 9; J. GROSS,
supra note 10.
22. See Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
23. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188
(1982)).
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This account of the Wagner Act questions any argument that the
Act is built upon particularistic institutional or organizational politics
regarding labor relations. Whatever the interests of the subsequent
National Labor Relations Boards or the courts, the Act seemed sim-

ply to allow these legal bodies to exercise power under the statute.
The Act did not define a determinate micro-labor-relations policy that
a board or a court would implement in the manner of discovery. For
example, the interview casts doubt on the overemphasis of the instrumental effect of section 924 in Board certification of bargaining unit
parameters, particularly as favoring craft or industrial units. 25 The
arenas of the 1940's and the Taft-Hartley Act 26 should not be directly
traced to the policies of the early 1930's.
In short, the contemplated Act structurally altered state-social
coordination.2" The problems and possibilities facing society resulted
in part from the inevitable presence of government: its costs, its politically dependent enforcement of entitlements, and its collective
address of breakdowns of complex social institutions and relations.
The inevitable intertwining of state and civil society required rationalization through political mechanisms that were guided by democratic
decisions. To that extent, the Act's labor policy was a macropolicy,
24. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 9, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. I 1984)). Section 9 of the Act
provides in part that:
(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any
individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer.
(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to
employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective
bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982).
25. See Finkin, supra note 4.
26. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)).
27. The argument takes no strong position on how and why the Wagner Act passed or on
its implementation. Thus, it is compatible with the arguments of Theda Skocpol and Kenneth
Finegold to "bring the state back" into causal analysis of social action: "Stated most generally,
our argument is that structures and party alignments are important in shaping policy
outcomes in advanced capitalist democracies. But just how they are important depends on
specific historical conjunctures and patterns of prior development." Finegold & Skocpol,
supra note 14, at 169. The point is to see how the ideas of Wagner and Keyserling develop a
particular vision within that picture.
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derived in part from fiscal and monetary policy. 2 At the same time,
this political economy approach to both the Depression and substandard living conditions, which took the form of labor law and administration, could be articulated and defended on grounds of social justice.
Indeed, the defense could be based on constitutional values by provid-

ing a scheme that accounted for governmental power as well as individual interests and due process. The additional fact that industrial
recovery stimulated by increased consumption due to higher wages
could be matched by production uninterrupted by labor strife, simply
added support for the central planning assumption and policy option
chosen.29

The ingenious political tightness of a new constitutional order,
combined with a fiscal contribution to economic recovery, embodied
in a substantial reordering of state labor policy and labor relations,
thus represents an intervention in current historical accounts of the
New Deal. The standard account of New Deal economic policy
describes more of an antipolicy: political responses to interest groups
using government to counterorganize the weak, for a better balance
against the strong. Ellis Hawley viewed labor unions as needing support for higher wages and job security, not increased employment,
cheaper goods, or an expanded social pie.30 He also distinguished a
28. This structure of the Act should be contrasted to the approach championed by another
self-proclaimed author of the Wagner Act, Judge Charles Wyzanski, who wanted both a
lawyer's bill-one defined by specific and symmetrical, rights-centered definitions of unfair
labor practices of both labor and management-and an enforcement authority located in the
Department of Labor. Both suggestions were rejected in the legislative process that ended
when the Wagner Act failed to pass in its first draft in 1934. P. IRONS, supra note 11, at 214,
230; see infra at 304.
29. In an address to Congress, Senator Wagner stated:
I want to emphasize ever more strongly the constitutional power and the
intent of Congress to prevent these unfair labor practices even where they do not
lead or threaten to lead to strikes. As economic conditions have changed, courts
on the whole have shown an increasing willingness to recognize that unsound
business practices are a direct burden upon the regularity and volume of
commerce.... When wages sink to low levels, the decline in purchasing power is
felt upon the marts of trade. And since collective bargaining is the most
powerful single force in maintaining and advancing wage rates, its repudiation is
likely to intensify the maldistribution of buying power, thus reducing standards
of living, unbalancing the economic structure, and inducing depression with its
devastating effect upon the flow of commerce.
79 CONG. REC. 7572 (1935) (address by Senator Wagner introducing the National Labor Relations Act, May 15, 1935).
30. See E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 195, 276-79
(1966); see also Lothian, The PoliticalConsequences of Labor Law Regimes.: The Contractualist
and CorporatistModels Compared, 7 CARDOZo L. REV. 1001, 1063-65 (1986). Lothian argues
that the Wagner Act confirmed the historical tendency to a contractualist, countervailing
interest in redistributing the wage term. The perspective is not asserted to be a complete
dismissal of corporatist state-private interaction. The article underemphasizes, however, the
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labor policy of countervailing power from what would have been a
Keynesian attempt to maintain full employment through stimulating
consumption and investment.3 However correct this theory may be
about the New Deal as a whole, it is misplaced when attributed to the
Wagner Act.3 2 While the legal academics see only labor relations, the
historians only seem to see the mid-level, countervailing power explanation of the Act.3 3 It is true that Senator Wagner insisted that aggregations of workers in national unions match the aggregations of
stockholders in corporations of increasing vertical integration, who
were allowed to negotiate industrial codes under the NIRA's suspension of the antitrust laws. Yet Senator Wagner, in speeches penned by
Keyserling, continually emphasized the deteriorating condition of
wages relative to profits as support for the bill on an anticyclical basis.
Wagner saw the development as a general problem of a complex economy that was not limited to the consequences of a particular downturn.34 Keyserling plainly states that increased purchasing power was
not an end in itself nor simply a matter of economic fairness or governmental evenhandedness given the existence of other recovery
measures.35 Rather, the working person's freedom could only be
connection of Wagner Act thinking to the corporatist aims of the NIRA and its section 7(a),
and fails to acknowledge the proto-Keynesian intent behind this specific state intervention in
labor relations-a corporatist influence different in kind and larger than a labor relations
policy. To this extent, her analysis follows traditional academic assumptions about the 1930's.
31. E. HAWLEY, supra note 30, at 278-79.
32. Mitchell, supra note 19, at 1067; see also C. TOMLINS, supra note 6, at 124 ("In
Wagner's bill, however, 'labor' was conceived of not as a set of organizations but as the mass of
individual employees which constituted the labor force.").
33. See, e.g., P. IRONS, supra note 11. But see Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and
Current Significance, 29 G.W. L. REV. 199, 220-21 (1960) (Wagner's "was no simple doctrine
of 'countervailing power.' ... He foresaw that this process within our enterprise system could
become an integral part of an every [sic] larger cooperative process guided by intelligence
which would animate the whole economy, including the governmental sector.").
In labor law literature, the only casebook to reference the macroeconomic intent found in
the Senate report follows with this dismissal: "The 'purchasing power' theory referred to in
the foregoing report, and the related idea that general increases in wages are an effective
antidepression measure, have for some time been rejected by many economists." B. MELTZER
& S. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW 38 (1985).
34. See, e.g., R. Wagner, Industrial Recovery and the Public Works Act (NBC radio
broadcast, June 13, 1933), quoted in Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER ACT
AFTER TEN YEARS 8 (L. Silverburg ed. 1945); Keyserling, supra note 33, at 218-19.
35. Indeed, Tomlins recognized Wagner's proto-Keynesian intent, but submerged its
importance by explaining the Act in the context of conflicting policies of various interested
parties. C. TOMLINS, supra note 6, at 23-29. In analyzing the 1935 bill, he emphasized the
Twentieth Century Fund's alternative policy of countervailing economic bargaining power to
raise wages, while admitting that Wagner's drafting took virtually no account of it, in order to
show that more than labor relations was in the political air. Id. He then overemphasized the
old NLRB staff's participation by stressing that Keyserling asked this group, with its lawyerly
interest in rights and procedure, for such drafting input. Id. For an example of this
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secure when economic health had been assured. Full employment of
social resources would spur consumption, which would in turn
36
increase the investment necessary to ensure this economic health.
The argument gains some further credence when considering the
Act's draftsman. Senator Wagner, in addition to his considerable
political power, insisted on retaining control over the drafting of all
legislation that he sponsored,37 and Keyserling was his sole legislative
aide from 1933 until 1938. Thus, Leon Keyserling occupied a central
role in the history of the Wagner Act in a way that was unusual for
the period of its passage-one that is virtually nonexistent today.
Subsequently, he was a central policy adviser to the Democratic Party
and several government administrations, 38 and a consistent and
strong voice for Keynesian economic policy. Keyserling, a protege of
Rexford Tugwell, was educated at "braintrust hotbeds, ' '39 Columbia
and Harvard. He subsequently authored the Employment Act of
1946," ° served as Chairman of President Truman's Council of Economic Advisers, and was the ghost writer for much of the HumphreyHawkins amendments to the Full Employment Act.4 ' His personal
history, both before and after the Wagner Act, coupled with Senator
Wagner's own interest in democratic, central economic planning, lend
plausibility to the proto-Keynesian intention of the draftsmen. Furthermore, this account of the ideas encoded in the Act is supported in
Leon Keyserling's papers, particularly in the evolution of the early
drafts and collateral correspondence.
Finally, whatever the simultaneous truths represented by and remisemphasis of confusing memoranda request with design, see J. GROSS,supra note 10, at 13238. For a work that partially corrects this mistake, see P. IRONS, supra note I1, at 226-28; see
also infra p. 306.
36. Keyserling, supra note 33; Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER ACT
AFTER TEN YEARS 5 (L. Silverburg ed. 1945).

37. I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 63; P. IRONS, supra note 11, at 226.
38. Leon Keyserling graduated from the Harvard Law School in 1931, studied economics
in graduate school with Rexford Tugwell at Columbia, and joined Senator Robert Wagner's
staff in 1933, where he remained until 1938. He served as general counsel to the Federal
Housing Administration, after drafting that agency's parent legislation, the National Housing
Act. He later joined President Truman's Council of Economic Advisers, and then became its
Chairman.
39. "The Brains Trust" was the name given to President Roosevelt's group of confidential
advisers. It included: Raymond Moley, Rexford Tugwell, Adolf Berle, General Hugh
Johnson, Samuel 1. Rosenmen, Robert K. Straus, Charles W. Taussig, and D. Basil O'Connor.
See R. TUGWELL, THE BRAINS TRUST at xi-xiii (1968). The term often also includes the
proteges these men brought with them to Washington.
40. Ch. 33, 60 Stat. 23 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1024 (1982)).
41. Full Employment and Balanced Growth (Humphrey-Hawkins) Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3152 (1982 & Supp. II
1984)).
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presented in the Act, the undeniable impact of political and economic
conflict and mediation in its name suggest that the Act's passage is a
fascinating event in legal and American history. In this interview,
Leon Keyserling discusses the context, the people, the political climate, the strategy and design of the Act, and the policies of its
implementation.
II.

THE PEOPLE OF THE DRAFTING

CASEBEER: As we begin would you like to make any general
remarks about the drafting or the passage of the Wagner Act?
KEYSERLING: Yes, I would like to make some general comments, remembering that it was 1933-fifty-three years ago-that I
started work on the drafting of the Wagner Act. Because of intervening events, my memory may not be completely accurate, but I think it
is reasonably accurate. In 1933, President Roosevelt turned to Senator Wagner on many measures, partly because he had been so very
active during the Hoover administration in the proposal of unemployment relief, public works, and economic stabilization measures, and
partly because he had been the youngest leader of the New York State
Senate when Franklin Roosevelt was a back-bench member, 42 plus
Wagner's standing in the United States Senate, and the fact that he
was from New York. So the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA) was introduced by Senator Wagner.
The background to the Wagner Act of 1935 is contained in the
history of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The National Industrial Recovery Act, which was one of the first measures of the New
Deal, was originally an embodiment of the so-called Swope Plan.
Gerard Swope, the president of the General Electric Company, who
was one of the most enlightened and far-sighted businessmen that I
ever met, advanced the plan during the Depression before the
Roosevelt administration. So the original Swope Plan was merely a
plan for the suspension of the antitrust laws so that business could
more effectively cooperate in the determination of business policies,
especially price policies, but also substitute avowed cooperation for
alleged conflict.
I had come down to Washington in March 1933 with Rexford
Tugwell because he had been my teacher at Columbia and I had been
42. To indicate the ambivalent relationship of Senator Wagner's office to the Presidency,
Keyserling remarked:
In those days, some people, such as Frances Perkins in her biography of
Roosevelt, referred to him as a diletante. Regardless of whether that was true,
that association was one of the reasons.
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in his department when I was an assistant in the economics department there, studying postgraduate economics after I had left the
Harvard Law School in 1931. I came to Washington at the instance
of Tugwell when he became Under Secretary of Agriculture under
Henry Wallace, and he brought me into the Department of Agriculture. He said, "I want you to help me and Henry," by whom he
meant Henry Wallace, "but you can get better pay if you're in the
legal department." So we got a push for the legal department under
Jerome Frank, who later became Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and then a judge on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting in New York. Jerome
Frank was slated to be the counsel to the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration (AAA), but that law had not yet passed. So he was
working without pay, while waiting for the law to pass, and Tugwell
sent me to see him. I had never seen Frank before. The first question
he asked me was, "Tell me what you know." I thought that was an
easy one. I said, "I know Cotton Ed Smith." Cotton Ed [Ellison
DuRant] Smith was the chairman of the Senate Agricultural Committee, who had sworn that the AAA would never become law, and that
even if it did, that Jew from the New York law firm would never be
confirmed. So when I said "I know Cotton Ed Smith," Frank
grabbed his hat and said, "Let's go," and up we went to see Cotton Ed
Smith. Within five minutes, Cotton Ed Smith had his arm around
Jerry and said, "My boy, you're going to get your act and you're
going to get confirmed too." The reason was very simple. Cotton Ed
Smith was a lifelong friend of my father's, who for many years was
the largest cotton grower and exporter, both domestically and internationally, from either of the two Carolinas.
We got in the taxi and started back for the Department of Agriculture and Frank said, "We haven't talked about salary. How about
$4,000 per year?" I had been getting one hundred dollars per month
from Columbia and about two hundred dollars from the General
Education Board of the Rockefeller Foundation. I was making a
study of teaching in the universities, and I had been getting some
money preparing plus-minus exams for the trust course at the law
school. When he said $4,000 per year, I said, "Well, that's just great
as a starter. But in the meantime, lend me twenty dollars so that I
can go back to New York and get my clothes because I'm flat broke."
Before the AAA actually became law, and I was the first lawyer
engaged by Jerome Frank, I got involved with Frank in meetings on
the National Industrial Recovery Act when it was solely a bill for the
suspension of the antitrust laws. Frank and I, and at times Tugwell,
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met with John Dickinson, who was Under Secretary of Commerce,
Harold Moulton, who was then head of the Brookings Institution,
and Winfield Riefler, who later became a high official at the Federal
Reserve Board. In connection with those meetings, we had a meeting
with Senator Wagner to discuss recovery policy in his office. That's
the first time I ever met him. I didn't say anything. I was twenty-five
years old and new. I listened to all these people talking for two hours
about recovery measures, and then Wagner rubbed his face and said,
"I'm awfully tired. We'll have to stop." So I got my first lick in. I
said, "Well Senator, I don't want us to leave with the impression that
we're all in agreement. I'm not in agreement with anything that's
been said." He said, "How's that?" I said, "Well, especially if you're
going to have a law for the suspension of the antitrust laws, and even
if you weren't going to have one, we have got to do something about
purchasing power. We've got to get in there something about the protection of collective bargaining, something about public works, and
something about wages and hours." Wagner said, "I agree with you,"
and the meeting broke up.
A day or two later he called me up and offered me the job as his
legislative assistant. We were then called clerks. I was clerk of the
Patent Committee, of which he was chairman. This committee was
never active.4 3
I went over to Wagner's office and immediately started working.
Here's where the Wagner Act started, with a bill for public works for
which I used the public works bills that Wagner had been introducing
for a number of years with Senators Edward P. Costigan and Robert
M. LaFollette, and the famous section 7(a) of the NIRA, dealing with
protection of the right of collective bargaining, which was the forerunner to the Wagner Act. The provision that wages and hours
should become part of the codes under the National Industry Recovery Act was the forerunner of the Wage and Hours Act of 1938, the
first general labor standards act.
CASEBEER: Who else besides Senator Wagner would have
43. In the early 1930's, Congressmen had small staffs, sometimes consisting of a single
professional. Wagner's position was' therefore prized. Here Keyserling identified his
predecessor:
I succeeded Simon H. Rifkind, who had been with Senator Wagner during his
first term, and who went back to his New York law practice in Senator Wagner's
firm. He later became a federal judge, and then resigned because he couldn't
send two sons to college on a $10,000 salary. He later joined with Randolph
Paul in the firm of Paul, Weiss, Wharton, Rifkind & Garrison.
44.-Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (West 1965 & Supp. 1987)).
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been interested in section 7(a) or some other provision like it being
included in the NIRA?
KEYSERLING: Well, naturally the AFL [American Federation
of Labor], and there were some economists, such as Sumner H.
Slichter, from Harvard. He was generally conservative. But I
remember that he came down and testified in support of the NIRA in
hearings for which I organized the witnesses. There was some support for it.
CASEBEER: Was Senator Wagner's initial concern with a provision like section 7(a) mainly from the standpoint of collective bargaining, of a countervailing power to business with the suspension of
the antitrust laws, or did he also have a prior commitment to increasing purchasing power?
KEYSERLING: He had a strong commitment to increasing
purchasing power. That was the basis of his earlier Public Works
Act,4 5 and the $3.3 billion public works bill which was put into the
NIRA. We arrived at the curious figure of $3.3 billion because that
was the sum total of the projects that Rifkind had collected for Senator Wagner's earlier bills with Costigan and LaFollette. So he was
interested in that, and he had had a long history of interest in labor
relations. He had secured the decision from the Court of Appeals of
New York when Cardozo was a member, but I think not yet chief
judge, which for the first time threw out the labor injunction.4 6 Wagner was the chief counsel for the unions in opposing the labor injunction. He argued before the Court of Appeals and had a good deal of
help from Herman Oliphant who later became general counsel to the
Treasury."
When these various provisions of the National Industrial Recovery bill had been drafted, Wagner took them to some of the final meetings. Now the history books tell something about those meetings, but
there is no record about what I've told you, the background of how
this thing got started. There is so much stuff that is never recorded.
Anyway, he took to these meetings the provisions related to collective
45. Public Works Administration Appropriation Act, ch. 90, tit. II, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
46. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N.Y. 65, 159 N.E. 863 (1928).
47. Of Justice Cardozo, Keyserling recalled:
In 1934, Cardozo had dinner with me and some boys with whom I was living,
because one of them was Justice Cardozo's legal secretary. He never had to do
any work because Cardozo wrote all his opinions from memory and didn't even
have to look at his law books for the citations. Cardozo said that when Wagner
appeared before his court in opposition to the labor injunction, he forgot the
name of one of the important cases when he was arguing the case. I said, "Well
judge, even if he did forget the name of one of the cases, he did much more for
the American people."
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bargaining, public works, and section 7(a), and that's the way they got
into the bill. All this happened before the bill was introduced.
Frances Perkins' biography of Roosevelt,4 8 which is very accurate, tells a story that's again told in a very recent book about FDR. a9
Roosevelt opposed the $3.3 billion for public works. We must
remember that his first act upon coming to Washington was the Economy Act,5" which reduced all our salaries by fifteen percent, including
reducing mine as legislative assistant to Senator Wagner from $3,900
to $3,315, where it stayed for quite a while. Even after there was an
agreement to put the $3.3 billion provision in the NIRA, Roosevelt
made a decision to take it out. Senator Wagner and Frances Perkins
prevailed upon Roosevelt that it could go in. So I can only speculate
as to whether Wagner would have put it in, whether Roosevelt
approved of it or not. But he did finally approve it. Section 7(a)
never really came to his attention, but Roosevelt's views on the subject were fully revealed when he came to the Wagner Act.
The NIRA became law after an interesting debate in the Senate.
In the summer of 1933 there were a good many strikes, especially
because section 7(a) stirred things up but couldn't be enforced.
CASEBEER: Let me ask you a question about the intent behind
section 7(a). From the standpoint of the supporters of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, not necessarily from the standpoint of Senator Wagner, did they understand section 7(a) as simply the necessary
political response to the suspension of the antitrust laws? If business
was able to combine in large trade associations then concomitantly
shouldn't labor be able to organize as well? Was it a political response
or was there some policy intent aimed at recovery in it? Did they
think that it was necessary for labor and management to coordinate?
KEYSERLING: It was almost entirely an aim at recovery. Of
course, the argument was used that it was more unanswerable to
include section 7(a) because of the suspension of the antitrust laws.
But that was not their main concern. Their main concern was the
fundamental and basic denial of the right to organize and bargain collectively. Their thinking was greatly influenced by the previous Railway Labor Act,' which had contained labor provisions protecting the
right of labor to organize and bargain collectively. Thus, the railway
labor unions had made much progress in numbers and negotiations.
48. F. PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW (1946).
49. T. MORGAN, FDR (1985).
50. Ch. 314, 47 Stat. 382 (1932).
51. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982 &
Supp. 1 1984)).
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We must remember that in 1933 the AFL had a very small membership, consisting of only a few million people.
The Act became law, and immediately section 7(a) was flouted.
Wagner was on a vacation in Europe and the President appointed a
nonstatutory Board to bring about the observance of section 7(a), or
at least the removal of the bitter strife that was arising. He appointed
Senator Wagner Chairman of that Board. There were three industrial
members: Walter C. Teagle, President of Standard Oil of New Jersey,
which was then the biggest industrial corporation in America; Louis
Kirstein, who was the President of Filenes of Boston; and Gerard
Swope. There were also three labor members: William Green, President of the AFL; John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers; and for some strange reason, Professor Leo Wolman, who was a
professor of economics at Columbia University, and a specialist in
labor problems. I had been in his class when I was doing graduate
work there. He later became a member of the New Deal and then
completely reversed himself, and became one of the outstanding columnists opposing the New Deal, as did Ray Moley, another Columbia
professor.
While Wagner was in Europe, he sent me a telegram asking me
to take his place until he got back. Well, you can imagine my taking
his place when I went over to the first gathering of the group. We
didn't do anything until Wagner got back, but I got a chance to know
them and size them up. They were interesting people, especially
Gerard Swope and John L. Lewis. Well, after Wagner got back, and
despite the composition of that Board, he got unanimous decisions
from them in all the cases that arose. There were controversies
between labor and management. He got unanimous decisions establishing the need to observe section 7(a), and Wagner's argument to
the other members of the Board, especially the business members, was
not on the merits or principles. He would just say, "It's in the law,
look at it." He got unanimous decisions in all cases enunciating the
principle of majority rule. Although they got unanimous decisions,
they got no enforcement. The situation became worse and worse.
You even had the terrible trouble with Tom Girdler in the steel industry, which led ultimately to what was called the "Memorial Day
Massacre. "
Later, in the fall of 1933, Wagner said, "We've got to draw up a
labor statute and a labor court." Now he didn't have any very definite
ideas in his mind as to what he meant by a "labor court." I think he
thought more of a regulatory court to hear labor matters. He asked
me to start working on a bill. All the way through, I had final author-
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ity, subject to Senator Wagner, as to what went into the bill.52
CASEBEER: In the process of starting to draft the first Wagner
bill, the Labor Disputes Act, who were the people that you consulted
directly? Who were the people that you were interested in having
input into the bill?
KEYSERLING: Well as I said, I had the final say, subject to
Senator Wagner. I was the draftsman, but I did get help. I got a good
deal of help from Milton Handler. Milton Handler was a distinguished professor of law at Columbia, and a very successful practitioner in the field of antitrust laws. Milton Handler became the
general counsel to the nonstatutory Labor Board, so I had a good deal
of contact with him. I also had a good deal of contact with a fellow
named William Gorham Rice, who was an assistant lawyer to Milton
Handler on the nonstatutory Board, and with some of his staff people.53 Later on, Senator Wagner was succeeded as Chairman of the
nonstatutory Board by Lloyd Garrison, who had been dean of the
Wisconsin Law School. He in turn was succeeded by Francis Biddle,
who later became Attorney General, after being a circuit court judge.
I worked with all of those people before the Wagner Act. I worked
with people representing the AFL, particularly a lawyer known as
"Judge," whose name was Henry Warrum, and another lawyer, who
was the counsel for the AFL, named Charlton Ogburn. I worked
more closely with Charlton Ogburn as counsel to the AFL. I also did
some work on the mechanics of the legislation, but not on the substance, with the staff of Senator David Walsh, who was chairman of
the Senate committee that handled the legislation, and his assistant,
and some other people like Bob LaFollette, who later conducted the
very revealing investigation of labor practices which was one of factors responsible for getting the Wagner Act passed.5 4
After the bill was introduced in 1934, it had tremendous opposition from industry and universal opposition from the press, including
52. The young men of the New Deal typically moved in small circles:
This is stated in the book, The New Deal Lawyers [P. IRONS, supra note Il, at
226-53] in the chapter on the Wagner Act. The man who wrote it verified what I
told him by speaking with Tommy Emerson, who lived with me in those early
days, along with Abe Fortas and various others-Ambrose Daskow, who was
secretary to Cardozo, and Howard Westwood, secretary to Justice Stone. I was
secretary and legislative expert to Senator Wagner. We had five men in the house
altogether.
53. 1. BERNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 63; J. GROSS, supra note 10, at 64-70. William
Leiserson and Benedict Wolf also contributed. I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 63; J. GROSS,
supra note 10, at 67.
54. Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor: Hearings on S. Res. 266 Before the
Subcomm. on Education and Labor, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 709 (1939).
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editorials by Walter Lippman. He wrote violent editorials against the
Wagner Act saying that it couldn't be made to work and it ought to
be scrapped. 5 So there was violent opposition. There was no support, except from the AFL, and a few economists and lawyers. One
of the lawyers who supported it was a man by the name of Robert Lee
Hale, who taught at Columbia Law School. It was a tremendous
battle.
The administration imposed a lot of obstacles with the active aid
of General Hugh Johnson, who headed the NRA, and Donald
Richberg, the counsel to the NRA who became its head when Johnson was forced out by Roosevelt. One of the obstacles was the creation of ad hoc boards to deal with these labor disputes. Roosevelt, at
the insistence of Johnson, created one in the automobile industry and
in other industries. These boards were terrible. Roosevelt said to the
press that labor has the right to be represented by anybody, whether
by a union or by the King of Siam or the like.
In the course of the battle, Charles Wyzanski, counsel to the
Labor Department, brought an alternative bill to us that was really
terrible from our point of view. It prohibited coercion from any
source and provided a bill of particulars of unfair labor practices by
both labor as well as employers, which had nothing to do with the
case because our Act was merely a bill to get labor the right to organize, which industry already had, and to bargain collectively.
CASEBEER: Was the origin of the Walsh bill more from Senator Walsh's motivation or from the Labor Department's motivation?
KEYSERLING: Well, it wasn't technically a Walsh bill. It
remained a Wagner bill but it was reported by Senator Walsh as
chairman of the Education and Labor Committee, which handled the
bill. Walsh may have had some predilections in that direction, but he
was fed a substitute, by Wyzanski, which still bore the name of
Wagner.
Walsh reported out of committee this greatly mutilated bill, and
then Roosevelt issued Resolution 44,56 which Wyzanski had drafted.
55. Keyserling never forgot these incidents:
Thirteen years later, in 1946, when the Taft-Hartley Act came up, I read an
article by Walter Lippmann that said that when the Wagner Act was up,
everybody recognized that it was a long-needed reform, but by now the
pendulum had swung and we needed the Taft-Hartley Act. So I wrote him a
letter: "Dear Walter, I read your article in the Post today and I'm sending you a
copy of the two articles that you wrote in 1934. I wonder how they could be
reconciled?" Wagner had answered the articles in 1934. A couple of days later I
got an answer from Walter, "You should have to write three editorials a week."
That was the only answer he ever gave me.
56. Resolution 44 was a joint resolution of Congress that reaffirmed the principle of
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Between Resolution 44 and the Walsh version of the bill, Senator
Wagner got up on the Senate floor when the bill came up for consideration and said that he was so dissatisfied with it that he was going to
withdraw it and would come in with a stronger bill next year.
Public Resolution 44 became law but it was a red herring. It
didn't accomplish anything. After we had worked on the 1935 version of the Wagner bill and strengthened it between the two Congresses, it was introduced and became law later in 1935. Various
efforts were made to sidetrack it. Joe [Joseph Taylor] Robinson was
the Democratic leader of the Senate, and Pat [Byron Patton] Harrison
was the majority whip, or the second ranking man. They took Wagner up to the White House to get Roosevelt to persuade him to withdraw the bill. The argument they gave was that the bill would be
defeated if it came up on the Senate floor. These were the leaders of
the Senate on the Democratic side. The Democrats had a big majority and the defeat of the bill would be very embarrassing to them in
the 1936 election. When they went up to the White House, Wagner's
only argument was, "Well, I don't care whether the bill passes or not.
But I'm going to have a vote on it." When he had the vote there were
only twelve votes against it. One opponent that I remember the most
was Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland, who was a Democrat, but
there were others, mostly Republicans. So it passed in that way and
then it went over to the House. The chairman of the House Committee was William Connery of Massachusetts.
There was no trouble in the House except for the controversy in
the committee about the placement of the Board, because the blandishments of Secretary Perkins to Connery placed it in the Department of Labor. We had to take it out based upon the reports that I
wrote for Congressmen Robert Ramspeck and Vito Marcantonio.
CASEBEER: I'm curious, how did Ramspeck and Marcantonio, so different in outlook, come to be the spokesmen for the
response to Connery?
KEYSERLING: Well, they were not acting in conjunction.
They did not file one report, they filed two different minority reports.
CASEBEER: And did they come to Senator Wagner?
KEYSERLING: No, I went over to the House side with the permission of Senator Wagner, and went to see a number of Congresscollective bargaining, but created no enforcement or recognition machinery. S.J. Res. 143,
H.R.J. Res. 375, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 11,635, 12,041, 12,120 (1934). President
Roosevelt acted on the Resolution by Executive order, establishing the nonstatutory National
Labor Relations Board, which succeeded the National Labor Board, which also was
nonstatutory, and is commonly referred to as the "old" Board.
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men, trying to get them to oppose the amendment, including a lot of
the liberal Congressmen. The only two I succeeded with, and I don't
know the reasons, were Marcantonio and Ramspeck-Ramspeck
probably because he wanted to do anything in opposition to the New
Deal and thought this was in opposition, and Marcantonio because he
was way over to the left. So I drafted for Marcantonio and Ramspeck-and they both made speeches on the House floor under the
three minute rule-and the amendment, which would have put the
bill in the Labor Department, was taken out. So there was no conflict
between the Senate and the House in conference on that subject.
That's the way it became law.
CASEBEER: I asked you about the people who had been initially involved with you in drafting the '34 bill. Were there other individuals who became important to the language of the '35 bill?
KEYSERLING: Very much so, and they are in part treated in
the book, The New Deal Lawyers.57 This treatment, however, is not
exactly correct because I found out that everybody claims that he
drafted the bill.58 But I got a great deal of help in 1935 from the new
staff of the nonstatutory Board, then headed by Francis Biddle. We
got a good deal of help from Calvert Magruder. Magruder was a professor at the Harvard Law School, a very fine man who later became a
very liberal chief judge of the First Circuit. In between that time, or
rather when he was counsel to the nonstatutory Board, and was living
in Washington working with me on the '35 version, we along with his
wife, Tommy Emerson, and some others, played a great deal of tennis
together. I was living with the Emersons in a house in Virginia,
which had a tennis court. Magruder used to come out and play with
us two or three times a week. But I worked with him. He had succeeded Milton Handler as general counsel. William Gorham Rice
continued, and I did some work with him, and I did some work with
Tommy Emerson who after having served with the National Recovery Administration, was a lawyer with the National Labor Relations
Board. I worked with them on the statutory language. They had very
little to say about the substantive provisions. Another one who was as
important as any of them was a fellow by the name of Philip Levy,
who had been on the Columbia Law Review and was a good friend of
mine. He was on Magruder's staff. He did a good deal of the work,
57. P. IRONS, supra note I1, at 226-27.
58. J. GROSS, supra note 10, at 132-38 (Gross relied heavily on memoranda on each
provision of the Act prepared by Philip Levy of the NLRB staff in order to show the
authorship of the staff in the drafting process.). Keyserling stated that the memoranda were
requested by him as research support and summaries of discussions. See infra at 342.
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and especially the research backing up some of the speeches, where he
was a very meticulous and careful researcher.
CASEBEER: You started to say that they worked more on the
technical legal structure.
KEYSERLING: No, not technical legal because it was all technical legal, but they had very little influence on the substantive provisions, the definition of the unfair practices, or the preamble, which I
want to come back to. They had a great deal of influence on the procedural provisions, which they practically drafted to correct some of
the defects found in the provisions for enforcement under the Federal
Trade Commission. They improved upon the language that I had
drawn substantially from those earlier statutes. The language of the
substantive provisions was more original, although I got some help
from the provisions of the Railway Labor Act 59 to which I referred.
Incidentally, the draftsman of the Railway Labor Act was supposed
to be Donald Richberg. He was a great friend of labor, although he
became a violent opponent of labor by the time he became counsel
and head of the NRA.
After the Act became law, the people who had opposed its passage more or less subsided. They did not worry much about it
because they were sure, in view of the decisions on the NIRA, that it
would be held unconstitutional. Incidentally, Cardozo was the only
one that kept his head, and all the other justices, including Brandeis,
opposed the NIRA on the general ground that under the commerce
clause the federal government just couldn't regulate these things.60
This was pretty silly if you paid any attention to Holmes' dissenting
opinion in Hammer v. Dagenhart,6 1 where the Court held unconstitutional the law prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of
goods produced by child labor, and where he said that the Constitution was not intended to embody any concept of the organic relationship of the individual to the State, or laissez-faire, but that it was
made for fundamentally different views. Well, in any event, all the
other justices, including Brandeis, were not only opposed to the
NIRA because it involved federal action. They were against most of
the New Deal for that reason. Cardozo was the only one who limited
his dissent to the issue of delegation of power, because when the
administration appeared before the Supreme Court in defense of the
Act, it appeared that they lost some of the fundamental papers, and
59. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982 &
Supp. 1 1984)).
60. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
61. 247 U.S. 251, 281 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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he objected to the provisions that delegated so much power to an
administrative body. He called it "delegation run riot." But he was
the only one who didn't go along with the Court on the general issue
of the commerce clause.
The opposition to the Wagner Act, which must not be confused
with the NIRA, subsided greatly. In the decisions on the NIRA,6 2
the Snyder-Guffy Coal Act,6 3 and even the New York minimum wage
statute, 64 the majority couldn't get Roberts to go along. Hughes only
had Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo in a five to four decision against the
New York statute. 65 The opposition subsided because they thought
the Wagner Act didn't have a chance of being declared constitutional.
So it sailed along until 1937.
But the Wagner Act was also part of a fight of the Hughes Court
against the court-packing plan. They completely reversed themselves
on constitutional law, and Hughes and Roberts joined Brandeis,
Stone, and Cardozo.6 6 I remember being in the Court with Hughes
reading the decisions supporting the Wagner Act even in the most
obvious cases regulating manufacturing within a state, on the ground
that it entered into interstate commerce. The Act was declared
constitutional.
One of the interesting things in connection with the drafting of
the Wagner Act was the great controversy about the preamble, which
I intended to set the argument for the constitutionality of the Act.
Charles Wyzanski took the position that the preamble enunciating the
reasons for the constitutionality of the Act should be limited to the
traditional grounds that violation of the Act caused industrial disputes and stoppages that reduced the flow of commerce. I put the
preamble in those terms, but also in much broader and novel terms,
that the denial of the right to collective bargaining burdens commerce, by adversely affecting the performance of the economy,
regardless of whether or not there was a strike. I even took the position that the strikes didn't burden commerce very much because after
the strike you made up for it. If you didn't sell a million automobiles
during the strike, you sold them when the strike was over. The main
factor was the burdening of commerce through the deficiency in
purchasing power.6 7
62. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
63. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
64. Morehead v. New York ex. rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618-31 (1936) (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting).
65. Id.
66. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
67. Professor Irons recognized the constitutional innovation in linking a due process

1987]

LEON KEYSERLING

III.

DESIGN

CASEBEER: Many of the difficulties with the Supreme Court
and any federal efforts, or any governmental efforts, to deal with the
consequences of the Depression were the twin obstacles of the interpretation of due process as laissez-faire liberty of contract, and the
limited notion of the commerce clause. The suggestion has been made
that the novelty in the approach was in seeing the two barriers as
inextricably linked to each other, and that you had to attack the interpretation of due process in order to understand the correct view of the
appropriate reach of the federal commerce clause. How did that
argument take shape? What made you think of what seemed to be a
gamble-frontally attacking both of the existing doctrinal barriers?
KEYSERLING: Well, it didn't arise in my mind, maybe wrongfully, out of any of the history that you relate or out of any of the
Court's decisions. It arose out of my own view that one of the basic
reasons for the Wagner Act was the effect that it would have upon
wage negotiations.6 8 Now there's independent proof of that and it's
conclusive. If you read Wagner's speeches from the time of the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933 until the introduction of the Wagner Act, 69 and certainly long before it became law,
he was always making speeches on the Senate floor criticizing the
National Industrial Recovery Act Boards on the ground that the
wage and price provisions were terrible, that we were going to run
into more recessions and trouble because of the failure of wages to
keep up with profits, and so forth. These speeches were the very basis
of the thinking that the Wagner Act was intended to redress some of
that, and if that was a real factor in the burdening of commerce, then
it should enter into the preamble. Wyzanski was very much opposed
on conservative grounds. I got a considerable amount of support
from Thomas Eliot, who was the assistant general counsel to the
interest in remedying the consequences of coercion that result from unequal bargaining power,
with disruptions of the economy appropriate to commerce power intervention. P. IRONS,
supra note 11, at 229-30. He failed, however, to see the breadth of the constitutional
justification extending to a concern for economic growth and stability. See also Mitchell, supra
note 19, at 1067 (stating that the Wagner Act was originally viewed as an instrument of
macroeconomic policy).
68. Going farther than Irons, Bernstein recognized that the preamble had a twin
constitutional and economic philosophy content. Yet Bernstein still characterized the
economic interest as a countervailing power for "have nots" versus "haves," rather than as a
step in economic planning to balance increased consumption and investment. I. BERNSTEIN,
supra note 9, at 90.
69. 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 9333 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 12,017
(1934); see also supra notes 29 & 34 (speeches by Senator Wagner on the need for government
planning and intervention in labor relations in order to stimulate economic recovery).
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Labor Department. He favored the broader preamble. Well, of
course, because we were in absolute control of the language of the
statute in 1935, that broader preamble did get into the final Act.
CASEBEER: But essentially you thought that the correct economic policy on labor-management relations demonstrated the inadequacies of existing Court doctrines on both the due process and the
commerce clauses?
KEYSERLING: Of course, because they didn't recognize the
effect of the substantive consequences of collective bargaining upon
commerce.
CASEBEER: And was it part of your thinking that because the
correct economic policy could be persuasively demonstrated, that it
was unnecessary to take the safer constitutional tact that Wyzanski
was proposing, focusing on the strike justification only?70
KEYSERLING: Well, there was a risk involved in the broader
language. I thought the risk worthwhile, and furthermore, I didn't
see where there was really much of a risk, because if the Supreme
Court didn't want to accept that second argument, if they were willing to accept the first, they'd have a basis for declaring the statute
constitutional. In any event, there was never a statute where politics
played more of a role, because the decision of the Court really overturned constitutional law, and it was a part of the very astute and able
campaign of Hughes against the court-packing plan." This Wagner
decision came before the court-packing plan was defeated and abandoned. Hughes led that fight, and actually took Brandeis with him to
appear before the congressional committee to refute the argument
that the Court was overburdened. Roosevelt's argument, that the reason for his court-packing plan was that the Court was overburdened
or the judges were too old, was not a very good ground. He could
have simply said that the decisions of the Supreme Court violated the
will of the people, violated the 1936 election, and violated the needs of
the country, and that you had to have a Court that would look at it
differently. Nevertheless, he went that way. That may have had
something to do with the defeat of the plan, although in the defeat of
the plan, Roosevelt lost a battle but won the war because he got a
complete reversal of constitutional history and constitutional law.
There were other decisions that followed that also reversed it, including the Social Security Act. 2 So that's the way that provision came
into being and how it got enacted into law.
70. 1. BERNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 64.
71. See supra notes 17 & 19.
72. Seward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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CASEBEER: How much of the opposition of Wyzanski to the
preamble was, in your mind, a lawyerly prediction for constitutional
difficulties or opposition to the basic underlying policies of increasing
purchasing power?
KEYSERLING: I don't think he had thought very much about
increasing purchasing power, so I don't think it would have been fair
to him to say that that was the basis of his objection. I thought the
basis of his objection was a perfectly lawyer-like objection, and he was
a very good lawyer. His objection was that the preamble went beyond
anything that the Court had recognized, and it was much better to
limit the preamble to what the Court had recognized, so that it could
become simply a matter of fact as to whether the cases under the
Wagner Act fell within the boundaries of that principle.
CASEBEER: In drafting the specific language in the declaration
of policy, was any73 of that argument crafted against the background of
Court decisions?
KEYSERLING: I must confess to you that apart from the constitutional law that I had studied when I was at Harvard regarding
the general question of the scope of the commerce clause and so forth,
73. Professor Gross noted, perhaps too strongly, the textual changes stimulated by
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). He viewed the bill's policies as
follows: "With the assistance of Philip Levy and Calvert Magruder of the NLRB and Leon
Keyserling, the bill's declaration of policy was revised 'to emphasize the effect of labor disputes
on interstate commerce and to de-emphasize the mere economic effects which had been
rejected by the court.' " J. GROSS,supra note 10, at 144 (quoting an interview between the
author and Philip Levy); see I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 121-22. Compare the Act's
surviving preamble, supra note 19, with the preamble contained in the third draft of the Act.
This preamble, the first one written in broad economic terms, read:
The tendency of modern industry toward integration and centralized control
has long since overturned the balance of bargaining power between the individual
employer and the individual employee, and generally has rendered the individual,
unorganized worker helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract, to secure a just
reward for his services, and to preserve his standards of living. As a direct result,
the national welfare has failed to keep pace with the national wealth. The failure
of the total volume of wage payments to advance as fast as production and
corporate surpluses has resulted in inadequate purchasing power, which has
accentuated periodic depressions and disrupted the flow of interstate commerce.
Inadequate recognition of the right of employees to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing has been one of the causes precipitating
strikes, lockouts, and similar weapons of industrial strife, with consequent injury
to interstate commerce. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to
remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate commerce by removing the
obstacles which prevent the organization of labor for the purpose of cooperative
action in maintaining their standards of living, by encouraging the equalization
of the bargaining power of employers and employees, and by providing agencies
for the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes.
The Papers of Leon Keyserling, Draft No. 3, National Labor Relations Act § 8, at 1-4 (Feb.
1934) (copies on file in the University of Miami Law Library).
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I really hadn't consulted all the recent Court decisions on the subject.
I wasn't really reading Court opinions when writing that preamble. I
was trying to make constitutional law.
CASEBEER: In going back but still focusing on the interaction
of the Labor Department and the bill, once the drafts had been pretty
much set on either the '34 bill or the '35 bill, were there points in
which people in the Labor Department, Wyzanski, the Secretary of
Labor, or other people, were consulted about the language? They
clearly had an interest in having whatever board was established
under the Labor Department.
KEYSERLING: I didn't consult them. They intruded. Wyzanski got into it through the Walsh report and in other ways. His differences with me were both on the substantive provisions, and on the
ground that it was unfair-the typical refrain of the business and
press oppositions-that this was a one-sided Act. Wagner made
many speeches asking how it could be one-sided to give labor the right
to organize and bargain collectively, free from interference. So they
objected to that and they objected to the preamble. But we didn't
seek them out for consultation. They just naturally came into the
picture as the Labor Department.
CASEBEER: Well, the Labor Department clearly wanted to
establish that whatever administrative apparatus was created would
be in the Labor Department. The Labor Department favored more of
a mediation or conciliation approach to labor-management disputes.
They also, as you said, favored a notion of mutuality in which there
would be unfair labor practices attached to both businesses and labor
organizations. In what ways did the Department attempt to change
or intrude into the actual drafting of the bill before it was taken to the
Senate? Was there ever any effort to influence the actual language
choices?
KEYSERLING: Yes, I think I still have some draft language
that Wyzanski drew before the Act was introduced. But in any event,
his more important action was in getting the ear of Senator Walsh,
who came from his home state of Massachusetts.
CASEBEER: Let me ask some questions about the influence of
Senator Wagner on the underlying ideas and policies of both the '34
and '35 bills. You've said that he was attracted to you initially in the
National Industrial Recovery Act discussions because of the argument you made about how administrative policy should be shaped,
and the appropriate economic understanding of what it could accomplish. Did he have a set of economic advisers or people he talked to
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that gave him a substantive understanding of what should be accomplished, or did you talk to him about it?
KEYSERLING: Apart from me, Simon Rifkind had done a
very good job during the six years he was with Wagner of interesting
him in unemployment relief. Rifkind, who was not an economist and
did not have much knowledge of the subject, brought in a lot of people to give their views. He consulted widely with economists and
obtained memoranda from them in connection with public works and
other matters. When I was there, we had people coming and testifying on the bills, but the people that I worked with in the course of the
preparation of the bill were the people I've mentioned, and not outsiders, because my views were fairly short and simple on this question. I
didn't feel that it was necessary to consult with advisers as to whether
you needed adequacy of purchasing power. I mean, there wasn't
much for me to consult with them about. On the technical details, the
outside people wouldn't have had much to offer anyway. I could get a
lot more from Milton Handler, or Calvert Magruder, who I was
working with, or those who were on the Labor Board, and Phil Levy
especially, who was quite a student of the history of the procedural
provisions under the Federal Trade Commission Act,74 where they
had a lot of trouble because of the deficiencies in language. We
strengthened that greatly.
Senator Wagner had strong views on the general economic issue.
In fact, the proof of that is the basis on which I got to work for him. I
was from South Carolina, and I'd never met him. It was on the basis
of those few minutes of remarks of mine that he offered me the job
when Rifkind was going back to New York, plus the fact that he used
to run into Tugwell, and Tugwell always recommended me to him
because of my writing flair. Tugwell's ideas influenced my thinking
on the subject of economics. But it was mostly the little interview
that we had. That also showed what was already Wagner's line of
thinking. Now also, as I said, he made many speeches from the inception of the NIRA on its one-sidedness, its treatment of the wage and
price problem, and its failure to enforce, or even try to enforce, section 7(a). Maybe the NIRA didn't have the legal authority, but it
didn't even try. The NRA opposed the Wagner Act. Richberg and
Johnson were violently opposed to it.
CASEBEER: I'd like to talk a little bit about how you translated your ideas about the general economic situation into the substantive parts of the '35 Act, and to do it in a couple of ways. One is
74. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982 & Supp.
I1 1984)).
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to talk about how and where you came to have those particular perspectives in general, and then how they became part of a labor-management policy?
KEYSERLING: I went to Columbia as a freshman in 1924 after
attending Beauford High School. We had to sign up for classes. Most
of them were compulsory. I had to take contemporary civilization, a
basic first year course, which was a review of the history of Western
thought, philosophy, economics, and everything else, going from the
Greeks and the Romans all the way through to the present. And I
had to take a course in English. On the basis of my entrance exams, I
was excused from the freshman course in English, but I had to take a
second year, more advanced course in English. I had to take a language, so I continued French. I had to take mathematics, so I took
trigonometry. That left one choice. I put down Greek on the advice
of a couple of men to whom I had been introduced by older cousins
who were juniors at Columbia. They were very nice to me, and
invited me to smokers and took me to the theatre. I was so naive that
I didn't realize that they were trying to get me into a fraternity, which
I did join against the advice of my father. He said they were clannish.
When I went to the gymnasium to register for my first year, and this
shows the element of chance, I happened to walk up to the desk of a
young instructor in government by the name of A. Gordon Dewey.
He looked at me and said, "Why do you want to take a damn thing
like Greek? Why don't you take history or government or economics?" But I'll swear if he had said, "Why don't you take history or
economics or government?" I would have said to put me down for
government. But since he said economics last, I said put me down for
economics. Then I walked into the first class of economics and the
instructor, Horace Davis, looked at my frosh cap and said, "Don't
you read the college syllabus? Economics I is open only to sophomores." So I started walking out. And then the second fantastic accident happened. He called me back and said, "Why don't you go up to
the sixth floor and talk to the head of the department. Of course, if he
says that you can take economics, then you can take it." So I went up
and I walked in on this man, and he didn't ask me my name or why I
wanted to take economics, his only question was, "How old are you?"
I said, "16." He said, "A man who is 16 years old can accomplish
anything in life that he wants to," and he signed me up for the course.
That man was Tugwell, which was the third fantastic accident, so I
took economics. Because of that, when I was in my second year, I
was a year ahead of the whole class in economics. I had a seminar
class with Tugwell, and I got to know him very well. That's the rea-
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son why five years later, after majoring in economics in college, I met
him again when I got out of law school.
Jobs were very tight because of the Depression, but due to the
fact that one of my father's farms had been bought by one of the
Guggenheims, and Guggenheim was a major client of Chadbourne,
Stanchfield & Levy, which was then one of the great New York law
firms, they offered me a job at $1,800 per year. You had to have a
clerkship before you could get your license, and $1,800 per year was
tops. Most of the firms weren't paying anything to their clerks compared to what they pay now. But the Sunday before I was to report to
that firm on a Monday, I happened to be taking a walk with a friend
of mine who I had gone to Europe with when I graduated from college. This was the next tremendous accident. I figured that the
chances of my going into economics were about one in a million. My
friend Bob said to me, "Why do you want to go into that law firm?
Why don't you go to see your old friend Tugwell who is doing work
with Governor Roosevelt?" So the next morning I appeared at Tugwell's office and he immediately offered me three jobs while I studied
economics at Columbia. I accepted a job as an assistant in the department that involved doing some work with the freshmen for the first
year course, including taking them around on trips to see leading
establishments like the morgue, Bellevue Hospital, Western Union
Telegraph, and the Ford assembly plant in New Jersey. I took the
class on trips and I did some lecturing, and that's how I got to know
him so well. I became so interested in economics that I went back
and studied, and after graduate school, Tugwell got me one of the
assignments that I had from the General Education Board of the
Rockefeller Foundation. They paid me one hundred dollars per
month to go around the country studying the teaching of the social
sciences in the universities. That's where I sized up the economics
teaching.75
75. Keyserling indicated his irritation with academic economists:
By the time that I left Columbia two years later to come to Washington, I had
completed all of the requirements for the Ph.D., except that I didn't write a
thesis, because I became too busy when I got to Washington. The consequence
was that despite this record of not writing a thesis about the monetary system of
Spain in the fourteenth century or some such topic, and in spite of the fact that

by the time I was appointed to the Council of Economic Advisers, I had had
thirteen years of experience in Washington, working more than anybody on all of
the basic legislation, and all of the basic national economic problems. Despite
my having all of the qualifications for being on the Council, the economics
profession took the sharp position that it was outrageous for Truman to appoint
me to the Council because I didn't have a Ph.D. in economics. By that point I
had written and published forty works that were much more important than
most Ph.D. theses. Actually, when I was appointed, some of the economists at
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Now as to the second part of your question, to what extent did
that enter into the Wagner Act? Very little. Aside from the preamble, the Wagner Act itself did not deal with the economic policy. It
dealt with the prohibition of unfair labor practices and the procedural
requirements for enforcing the statute. So it really didn't deal with
economics. The economics, however, were dealt with concurrently in
all the speeches that Wagner made, the congressional reports on the
Wagner Act that I wrote, the speeches on the Senate floor, and his
articles in the New York Times and elsewhere defining the economic
reasons for the Wagner Act, and being very, very critical of the
administration of the NIRA. Although he had been the congressional
sponsor, he was very critical of how it was being administered. Those
talks contained studies of the trends in wages, profits, prices, and the
economy and what was happening to it.
CASEBEER: Was there any thinking at the time, either by
yourself or by Senator Wagner, that the Wagner Act itself was a keystone, or a part of a recovery program which was really an alternative
to the National Industrial Recovery Act's approach?
KEYSERLING: It was not an alternative because Wagner never
abandoned the idea of the importance of cooperation between government and business, and the limited type of economic planning that the
NIRA represented. He made a speech on the Senate floor when the
NIRA was declared unconstitutional in which he said that as a former judge, he never questioned the supremacy of the decisions of the
Supreme Court, but he pointed out the many great accomplishments
of the NIRA.7 6 Despite its one-sidedness, it was the beginning. It did
Harvard and M.I.T. organized a committee, and got an interview with Truman
to tell him why I shouldn't be appointed. Truman listened patiently for fifteen
minutes. At the end he said, "Gentlemen, the reasons you've given me for not
appointing Keyserling are the very reasons why I'm going to appoint him." I
have never really had a good relationship with most of the profession, although
outstanding people such as Alvin Hansen strongly supported me, and Ken [John
Kenneth] Galbraith had assigned most of my pamphlets. This was the case not
because of that early history, but rather because during all the later years, I've
been so critical of what they were doing and written so much along different
lines. I think they're bankrupt. I don't think they deal with the problems.
That's how I became interested in the economic aspects of the Wagner Act.
76. 79 CONG. REC. 9417-18 (1935) (speech by Senator Robert F. Wagner). Senator
Wagner said that:
The main obstacle to recovery was an outworn philosophy of government
that had been suited to the oxcart era, but that was totally unadjusted to the
machine age. It was a dogma insisting upon extreme individualism at a time
when the individual had become the helpless victim of forces too big and too
powerful for him to control. It was a dogma that failed to perceive the need for
national action although our mighty industries had burst the bounds of
conventional State lines and were country-wide or even international in their
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accomplish the abolition of child labor. It did accomplish improvements of wage and price policies, and so forth.
Senator Wagner had an article that I wrote in the Survey
Graphic, which was then a leading journal of social policy edited by
Paul Kellogg. He "wrote" the article just a few months after I went
to work for him. The article was titled, Planning in Place of
Restraint,7 7 and argued in support of the National Industrial Recovery Act just after it was enacted. This was a pro-planning argument.
Wagner was a planner. He was not a fascist-type planner, but he was
a government planning man. He had had a statute passed during the
Hoover administration that provided for the establishment of the Economic Stabilization Board. The principles of that Act were that
whenever the indexes of economic activity fell below a certain point,
the government would step in with compensatory public spending in
the form of public works. Now, that became law and the Board was
appointed, but Hoover never did anything under it. So Wagner had a
long history in this field even before I went to work for him.
CASEBEER: Of course, there is nothing necessarily inconsistent with a demand strategy for recovery and an economic planning
strategy for recovery, but they also aren't necessarily the same. Did
you share his commitment to a planning approach?
KEYSERLING: That brings me to something that is beyond the
scope of this discussion, and that is my role in the Employment Act of
1946.78 This Act was entirely a planning statute that set goals requiring the quantification and balance of production and consumption,
and investment and consumption, with the required flows of income,
and the effect upon tax and monetary policy. That's what I've been
writing about ever since. That's what we did when we were in Truman's administration, and we had such a good record on production,
employment, inflation, and a balanced federal budget, all at the same
time. But actually I had learned that from World War II, when all
those policies had been followed in an extreme fashion. I had argued
that if you learned during the war of new kinds of anesthesia, you
don't abandon them because the war is over. The continuation of
these policies after the war didn't import the high taxation and the
direct controls that you had had during the war. The reason for those
was not because you were planning, but because the planning showed
scope. It scoffed at the possibilities of Nation-wide cooperation although
cooperation was the only safeguard against social disintegration on one hand or
radical overthrow on the other.
Id. at 9417.
77. See Wagner, Planning in Place of Restraint, supra note 15.
78. Ch. 33, 60 Stat. 23 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1024 (1982)).
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that if you were burning up half your product in fighting the war, and
paying out wages and salaries for the whole product, the purchasing
power is twice as much as the civilian supply, and you therefore had
to have controls and higher taxation. But the planning features, the
setting of goals, the development of balanced relationships, and the
use of tax and monetary policy in support of them, were just as necessary after the war, and we used them in the Truman administration.
They were amplified further in the Humphrey-Hawkins Act,79 which
was really an amendment to the Full Employment Act of 1946. The
complete violation of that policy in everything that's been done since
1966 occurred just as much during the Carter administration as during the Reagan administration: no planning; the use of tax and monetary policy to distribute income upward; and no consideration of the
equilibrium requirements of investment and consumption. All that's
been abandoned, and the whole concept of full employment has been
abandoned. You would think that the only purpose of economic policy was to balance the budget, to balance our international trade
accounts, to reduce the price of the dollar, and to get rid of the federal
deficit-all of which are secondary issues, all of which are means
rather than ends, and all of which are aberrations that have occurred
mostly from the failure to have a full-production economy. The deficit has not been caused by too much spending or too little taxation.
It's been caused by the fact that you can't squeeze the blood of additional federal revenues out of the turnip of a starved economy. Well,
all those deviations have taken place since 1966 and increasingly in
later years.
IV.

LABOR POLICY

CASEBEER: In the substantive provisions of the '35 Act, the
Wagner Act, the provisions on unfair labor practices are in large part
related to some of the experiences of the nonstatutory Board and the
first or "old" NLRB, concerning company union practices and other
practices that frustrated the intent of section 7(a). Was any consideration in drafting those unfair labor practices directed toward the outcome of collective bargaining? Was there an attempt to match wage
rate performance with productivity performance? Or, was the drafting of those provisions mostly directed against the administrative failures of the prior Boards?
KEYSERLING: The provisions of the Act were directed toward
79. Full Employment and Balanced Growth (Humphrey-Hawkins) Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3152 (1982 & Supp. II
1984)).
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specifying what were prohibited as unfair labor practices, and providing the administrative procedures for achieving the goals of the Act.
The provisions of the statute itself were not economic, except for the
preamble, and didn't deal at all with the empirical record of pricewage policies. They were dealt with, however, in the speeches that
Senator Wagner made and in the committee reports, which I wrote,
and in the articles that he wrote for the New York Times and other
magazines, all of which dealt with the economics in support of the
Wagner Act. Some of them became part of the legislative history.
CASEBEER: That's really why I'm asking the question. Much
of the supporting argument for the passage of the bill seems directed
towards the weakness of consumption and purchasing power in the
economy. But in your view, would the substance of the Act be something that would naturally contribute to the larger economic goal?
KEYSERLING: Naturally, because it would place labor in a
more equal bargaining position at the wage table and at the supplementary benefits table. But the Act itself did not go into those matters. The Act did what I said it would.
CASEBEER: With the language in the preamble about equalizing bargaining power, with the twin objectives of increasing consumption and more adequate collective bargaining aimed at limiting labormanagement disputes, together with the language on contributing to
industrial peace, was it the view of either you or Senator Wagner that
the strengthening of the collective bargaining process itself was the
objective of the Act, and that that automatically would contribute to
industrial peace? Or, was there some sense of the need to manage
labor-management relations governmentally in order to create industrial peace?
KEYSERLING: The provisions of the statute were solidly based
on the proposition that the denial of the right to organize and bargain
collectively was the source of the most fractious and bloody types of
industrial disputes. Senator Wagner's empirical review of history
after the Act had been vindicated in 1937 showed almost a vanishing
of those types of industrial disputes.8" Maybe "automatically" isn't
the right word, but it was our view that the greatest contribution to
greater equity and the distribution of the product between wages and
profits would come, not through the definition of terms by government, but by the process of collective bargaining with labor placed in
a position nearer to equality. We never accepted the view that labor
80. See National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments: Hearings on S.J. Res.
114 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 76th Cong., Ist Sess., 84 CONG. REC.
4184 (1939).
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had equal bargaining power, much less the frequently heard view that
the pendulum had swung the other way and that labor had all the
power. Labor has never had any equality of bargaining power. The
United Auto Workers has never had the power of the General Motors
Corporation in terms of funds. They didn't have the lasting financial
resources. They won a lot of benefits through the leadership of Walter Reuther, and because work stoppage was a very important
weapon. But to say today, especially with the kind of Labor Board
existing now, that labor and management are in positions of equality,
is refuted by any examination of the history of the actual trends in
economic development and the division of purchasing power. Plus,
the fact is that the government in recent years has increasingly
become an instrument for the distribution of income upward through
tax and monetary policy. You would need even greater compensation
on the wage-price front, and you have been getting the reverse. The
real average wages of nonsupervisory work in manufacturing today,
or of industry today, are no higher than they were ten or fifteen years
ago, which is fantastic.
CASEBEER: In that sense, the goal of industrial peace was not
thought to be an independent goal that was meant to limit the effect of
the Act to contribute to a more equalized bargaining relationship?
KEYSERLING: It was directed to both, but there was also the
other side of it. I was very much influenced by some of the things that
Brandeis had said when he got involved in the steel industry disputes
many years earlier. At that time, he was the so-called "counsel for
the people." The argument against the rights of labor at that time
was that the workers, after all, were well paid and well fed. Brandeis
didn't necessarily accept that. What he said, and I always
remembered it, was, "Even if men are well fed, they will still struggle
to be free." So you see, we were interested in the struggle to be free as
well as in the bread and butter issue. I really don't know whether we
explicitly weighed one higher than the other. They were complementary and each fed the other, both on the plus side and on the minus
side.
CASEBEER: The reason I asked the question is that in some
senses, courts' interpretations of the Wagner Act in recent years have
increasingly emphasized the goal of industrial peace as a way of limiting the bargaining relationship of both labor and management.
KEYSERLING: That's the natural tendency of the courts, and
actually, it is a conservative trend. It's a more traditional approach.
Now as I said, Brandeis had said at the time of the steel controversies,
in which he played a part, that even if men are well fed, they will still
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struggle to be free, which I thought was a very strong statement.
Wagner said somewhat the same thing in one of his most important
speeches,8" in which he argued in support of the Wagner Act after it
had been passed, but before it had been declared constitutional. Wagner said, "Men versed in the 82tenets of freedom will become restive
when not allowed to be free."
CASEBEER: In that regard, what do you think was the greatest
contribution of the Act to the goal of increased freedom for labor, for
the working man?
KEYSERLING: The greatest contribution is what happened.
The membership in the AFL, and later the AFL-CIO, rose from 3 or
4 million to 18 or 20 million, depending on how you count it. The
whole process of wage negotiation and wage determination changed
profoundly. That's one of the reasons why we had such a good economic record. We didn't have the sharp recession after World War II
we had had after World War I. From 1920 to 1922, we had one of the
worst depressions we've ever had, obscured only by the crash of
1929.83

CASEBEER: Let me ask one other question about the Act as a
whole and your participation in it. Is there any part of the final Act,
the '35 Act, of which you are most personally proud or find most
significant?
KEYSERLING: No, I wouldn't say so. I love the thing as a
whole. I am equally proud of the preamble, which was an innovation,
and the substantive provisions. I am more proud, if you want to use
that term, of these parts than of the administrative provisions because
the administrative provisions are much less creative in the sense that
they were borrowed from the Federal Trade Commission procedure,
and because others had more of a hand in drafting them than the
parts of which I am most proud, simply from the point of view of
authorship. But the guts of the statute are in the preamble and the
substantive provisions. The administrative provisions are merely
commonplace to any administrative statute that has to be enforced. I
think they were better devised in the Wagner Act than in the earlier
statutes, but I couldn't take much personal responsibility for that,
even though I recognized the need for people with more knowledge in
81. 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935) (speech by Senator Wagner introducing the NLRA).

82. Id. at 7570.
83. At this point Keyserling repeated a personal memory of economic collapse:
I remember my father had 10,000 bales of cotton and the price almost over night
dropped from forty odd cents per pound to eighteen cents per pound. That
began the end of prosperity for that part of the country. He then turned to truck
farming.
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that field, and the need to turn to people like Milton Handler who had
had so much experience as an antitrust lawyer.

V.

EVENTS

CASEBEER: At this point, can we talk about the relationship,
if any, between the events connected with labor in the period from
1933 to 1935, and the adoption of the Wagner Act? First, were there
any particular events in strikes or other organizational activities of
labor that either were related to Senator Wagner's concerns, or to the
political atmosphere in which the Act was received?
KEYSERLING: That was during the period when Senator
Wagner was Chairman of the nonstatutory Board, beginning in the
summer of '33. He didn't stay at that job until 1935. He found that
he didn't have the time because of Senate activities and his involvement in the housing legislation and other things. He also began chairing the Banking and Currency Committee.
CASEBEER: Were there events in the labor community?
KEYSERLING: Yes, there was a great deal of economic strife
during that period. The most significant was the "Memorial Day
Massacre" of the steel industry, to which Tom Girdler was connected
as president of Republic Steel. That was just one example of the bitterness of industrial strife.8 4 The statistical history of it has been
reviewed in some of Senator Wagner's speeches.
CASEBEER: Was the increased strike activity in '33, '34, and
'35 related more to the issue of job security and employment or to the
issue of collective bargaining itself?
KEYSERLING: More to collective bargaining itself. The other
aspects evolved into greater significance later, but the most bitter disputes were on the issue of the right to bargain collectively. That was
the great disturbing issue. That is treated in some of the Senator's
articles in the New York Times. 5
CASEBEER: How important was it that the federal government
had seemingly made a commitment in section 7(a) to the principle of
collective bargaining?
KEYSERLING: It was terribly important, because that is what
was being violated. That was the thing that labor and others could
get their hands on when they talked about this problem. The government guaranteed the right but had done nothing to enforce it.
84. P. IRONS, supra note 11, at 214.
85. Wagner, Company Unions. A Vast IndustrialIssue, New York Times, March 11, 1934,
at 1, col. 1.
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CASEBEER: Was that important in labor's support for the
Wagner Act as it ultimately took shape?
KEYSERLING: It was important in the initiation and development of the Wagner Act because the idea for the Wagner Act
originated when Senator Wagner said that we needed an industrial
court because we couldn't enforce section 7(a). So that was its original purpose. Now on the other hand, if hypothetically there had been
a Wagner Act but not a section 7(a), maybe labor would have been
equally interested.
CASEBEER: To what extent did the AFL feel comfortable with
the specifics of the Act? They would have been very supportive of
governmental action to establish more than just a promise of collective bargaining.
KEYSERLING: The AFL was very satisfied, which was both
good and bad. It was very good because they had a good statute to be
satisfied with. It was bad because in my examination of the history of
the relationship between labor and legislation from then until now,
organized labor has never been the originator or creator of any of the
important progressive economic or social legislation that has benefitted labor. When I came to Washington, the AFL still was formally
opposed to unemployment insurance. If you take section 7(a), social
security, housing, or the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, labor never was in
the forefront of creative initiation.
CASEBEER: It was suggested, I believe in Peter Irons' book,86
that there was more than a coincidental symbolism in making the primary substantive provision of the Wagner Act, section 7, parallel to
section 7(a) of the NIRA. Was that a conscious decision?
KEYSERLING: You mean the numbering of the section? I
think that was accidental. I wouldn't remember that. Maybe it was
done deliberately.
CASEBEER: In the initial reception of the Wagner Act, do you
think that the impact on reducing labor-management strife was attributed solely to the improved enforceability and administrative mechanism for enforcing the right of collective bargaining, or was there a
symbolic importance that labor attached to the passage of the Act?
KEYSERLING: I think there was a connection, but actually
you have got to be careful because I never believe that you can really
compare an actuality with a hypothetical. I would have to guess what
would have happened if there hadn't been a Wagner Act. So it is
temerious to try to form any real estimate. I have a strong feeling that
86. P. IRONS, supra note 11, at 227.
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Wagner always took the position that the reduction of that kind of
bitter strife was due to the recognition of unions. That seems like a
very logical position, but you can see that it is not perfect because you
still have the Wagner Act with a different complex of political and
economic forces, and a different Labor Board, and now with TaftHartley,8" they are moving backwards toward renewed and more bitter opposition to labor. You couldn't have believed in 1935, that until
a year or two ago, it would have taken ten years of terrible strife in the
textile industry with the J.P. Stevens Company before they would
even recognize that there was a Wagner Act. So who knows just
exactly how it would have worked out. I think the evidence is as
conclusive as it could be in this field, that the Wagner Act in its earlier years had a great influence upon the reduction of bitter industrial
strife. Even including J.P. Stevens, there has never been the kind of
situation that you had in the Homestead strike, or that you had in the
Tom Girdler situation, or that you had in the Rockefeller cases with
Josephine Roche's company.
CASEBEER: I ask the general question in part to try to distinguish the support and reaction of the rank and file from the support
and reaction of the leadership. It has been suggested that particularly
in section 9, the linking of the election unit with the bargaining unit
was objectionable to the AFL even though they strongly supported
the passage of the bill.88 Were there objections to the unit certification sections contemporary to the drafting?
KEYSERLING: Not much, except on one occasion. When I
was drafting the Wagner Act, William Connery, the chairman of the
House Labor Committee, rushed over to my office to see me, and said
that the AFL was very concerned about the Wagner Act because it
would strengthen industrial unions at the expense of the craft unions.
Industrial unions were not then in the AFL. I tried to reassure them
and was effective at least in getting them to go along. But there was
that ripple. It couldn't have been very much of a ripple because their
support of the Wagner Act was strong.
Later on, the amendments of 1937 came from two sources.
There were the amendments projected by conservative Senators, and
there were those amendments articulated by the AFL in opposition to
the industrial unions. Senator Wagner, maybe surprisingly, didn't go
along with his old friends in the AFL by supporting their amendment.
He strongly supported the original Act and testified against both the
87. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)).
88. I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 96; J. GROSS, supra note 10, at 134.
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AFL amendments and the Burke amendments,8 9 and he was successful in that the Act was not amended. The Taft-Hartley Act came
much later.
It is interesting to speculate what would have happened at the
time of the Taft-Hartley Act if Senator Wagner hadn't had to withdraw because of ill health. He couldn't even get down to participate
in the vote on Taft-Hartley. Further, to illustrate what I said about
the position of the Truman administration, all members of the cabinet
except the Secretary of Labor, including Harold Ickes, Secretary of
the Treasury, urged the President to sign the Taft-Hartley Act. Yet
in 1947, when the Taft-Hartley Act came up for a vote, Secretary
Ickes, who had never voiced a word of support for the Wagner Act
during the two years that we struggled for it, took the public position
that Senator Wagner didn't participate in the Taft-Hartley vote
because he wanted the Taft-Hartley Act to pass, so that the Democrats would have a political issue in the next campaign. Now could
you imagine anything more fantastic than that? But that is what he
said, which shows the Truman administration's complete disavowal
of any knowledge of the Wagner Act and its history.
CASEBEER: Can we talk about the relationship and sometime
opposition of the Roosevelt administration to the Wagner Act? We
have already discussed that the two acts, the '34 draft and the '35
draft, were largely handled from within the Senator's office. Did
Roosevelt have a defined labor policy in mind or in his proposals that
was contrary to the Wagner Act?
KEYSERLING: When defining Roosevelt's labor policy, if you
want to be charitable, you can say that it was pragmatic. If you want
to be realistic you have to say that it was rather confused and experimental to the point of being entirely ad hoc. He just tried one thing
after another depending upon what the latest person recommended to
him. The industrial boards, Public Resolution 44, and his pronouncements on the Wagner Act, were examples of this. So, I would say that
he didn't have very much of a labor policy. Senator Wagner was correct in saying that Franklin was too busy sailing boats at Hyde Park
to learn much about labor problems.
CASEBEER: Do you think that that attitude explains President
Roosevelt's intervention into and the subsequent setting up of the
89. On the origin of these attempts to change the Act, Keyserling added:
Senator Burke's amendments were partly independent because they were more
industrial provisions and I don't think Senator Burke was exactly a handmaiden
of the AFL.
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Automobile Labor Board, which undermined the approach of the
National Labor Board?
KEYSERLING: I think that was almost entirely the product of
listening to the people he had talked to most recently, particularly
those people he would naturally have turned to. The advice that
caused him to act in that manner came essentially from Hugh Johnson and Donald Richberg, who were still over at the National Recovery Administration. They were responsible for the administration of
section 7(a). They were the people that he naturally turned to, and
they were the people, I think, that were primarily responsible for his
decision to take action on those individual boards. I don't know what
position the Labor Department took. I really don't know whether
they were even consulted.
CASEBEER: Did either the White House or the National
Recovery Administration understand that they were undermining the
National Labor Board?
KEYSERLING: I don't think they understood it very thoroughly, and I don't think they cared very much about the nonstatutory Board, particularly after Senator Wagner's time there. The
administration held Senator Wagner in high esteem, but he was only
around for a period of grace. He was the administration's main spearhead in the Senate for almost everything.
CASEBEER: The failure of enforcement, therefore, was more
the result of neglect rather than an intentional undermining of the
nonstatutory Board's policies?
KEYSERLING: I think that is true of Roosevelt, but I don't
think it was true of Johnson or Richberg at all. I think that they
intended to undermine those policies.
CASEBEER: What was their primary source of opposition?
KEYSERLING: They had contacts with the industrial community, which explained their attitudes and the general skewing of the
NIRA toward business. They were business products. There was the
same influence by the business community as in agriculture. In agriculture, the farm giants controlled and represented the leadership of
the farm committees on the Hill and were behind Henry Wallace, the
great liberal, and the purging of Tugwell and Frank from the Department of Agriculture when Frank was named Chairman of the SEC,
and Tugwell was named the head of the Resettlement Administration.
They were both thrown out of the AAA, and the bane of both of them
was George Peek, the administrator of the AAA. George Peek was
the selection of Bernard Baruch. So you have the same combination
of forces in the AAA, despite the reputation of Henry Wallace. This
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is apart from the fact that the programs were substantially in conflict
with one another, as were many of the New Deal laws; the AAA was
trying to plow down production to get prices up, and the NIRA was
trying to expand production due to unemployment.
CASEBEER: So their opposition was not simply a matter of
antagonism about the appropriate bargaining position of labor to
management, but rather concerned the effect that a truly strengthened
labor force would have over the direction of economic recovery?
KEYSERLING: Of course. They were antilabor to put it into
words.
CASEBEER: When the response in the form of a strike wave in
1933 and 1934 forced the Roosevelt administration's hand, and forced
Public Resolution 44, which led to the establishment of the old
NLRB, did the prior opposition to the NIRA still influence the weakness of the enforcement of the second Board?
KEYSERLING: I don't think that Resolution 44 was primarily
in response to what you cite. I think the primary objective of "44"
was to derail the 1934 Wagner Act. I think "44" was the answer to
the Wagner Act.
CASEBEER: So it was simply a political substitute? It wasn't
really intended to change the enforceability of a new labor policy?
KEYSERLING: Well, they actually claimed that it would be
effective, but I don't see how they could have thought so.
CASEBEER: The reason I asked the question is that it has been
suggested by commentators that the failure of the nonstatutory Board
was due to the failure of the enforcement provisions that were located
in the NIRA, but that the failure of the first NLRB, the Public Resolution 44 Board, was due to the lack of enforcement interest in the
Justice Department and more of a dragging of the feet on legal
grounds than labor policy. 9°
KEYSERLING: I think that is quite likely. The Justice Department may have been justified in the sense that Public Resolution 44
didn't give them very effective legal grounds to take to court. I think
that the Justice Department's view, unlike that of the NIRA, was not
primarily ideological. It was not taking sides in the conflict; but
rather, the Department generally felt that it didn't have very good
legal grounds to stand on. They may have felt the same way about
taking the National Industrial Recovery Act into court, but they had
to do that. They couldn't do anything about it. It was too important.
The violations were too widespread.
90. P. IRONS, supra note 11, at 220-25.
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CASEBEER: Regarding the intent of the Act, one commentator
has written:
Both the Senate and the House reports stress the continuity of the
Labor Act with prior law-the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
sequence of railway labor legislation culminating in the 1934
amendments to the Railway Labor Act of 1926. The principle of
majority rule, so hotly contested when originally enacted, was
imported from the railway labor legislation; and the phrasing of
sections 7 and 8(1) of the Wagner Act was carried over essentially
verbatim from the Norris-LaGuardia Act via section 7(a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, which had a developed case law
under the (old) National Labor Relations Board. 9'
Essentially, this commentator is arguing that the provisions had been
established politically by the earlier legislation.
KEYSERLING: In the first place, they hadn't been established
politically in the sense of providing political easements for the Wagner Act, because the Railway Act had the support of the railway
unions, which were the powerful unions at that time. They had more
power with Congress than all of the other unions put together. That
is why they got a Railroad Retirement Act 92 before the Social Security Act.9" This is also why they got the Railway Labor Act many
years before the Wagner Act or even section 7(a). The railway
unions' political power disposes of the idea that they created a political easement for the Wagner Act.
With regard to the second part of the question as to whether
portions of the Wagner Act had been drawn from elsewhere, I think
three different acts were cited. In one sense it is true that the Act was
based on other acts because I studied all of those different acts and
drew upon them. But in another sense, it is profoundly untrue,
because I still had to decide which ones I was going to select from,
which ones I was going to ignore, which parts of each act I was going
to modify, and which parts of each I was going to take virtually verbatim. So it is true that I consulted those acts a good deal, especially
the Railway Labor Act. The Norris-LaGuardia Act9 4 deals with a
much more limited subject. It's phraseology in terms of the rights of
labor may have been relevant, but it deals specifically with the labor
injunction, which was a different issue. It involved the making of
labor law by the courts. The statement that we relied upon other acts,
91. Finkin, supra note 4, at 46-47.
92. Ch. 868, 48 Stat. 1283 (1934).
93. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
94. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982 & Supp.
1 1984)).
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therefore, is essentially true, but its implication is overdrawn if it was
meant to suggest that we simply relied upon those other acts. We
looked at them and used them selectively, and sometimes accepted
them and sometimes didn't.
CASEBEER: The argument has been made that the recognition
provisions in the Act were intended to create a bargaining agent for
labor that would be able to establish conclusively an organization of
labor-management relations; that the point of the Wagner Act was to
establish contracts to govern labor-management relationships. Is that
a fair characterization of the legislative intent?
KEYSERLING: Yes and no. I don't think Wagner would ever
say that, despite his feeling about equality of bargaining power and his
support for effective contracts. I don't think that politically he would
have argued that his purpose for the Wagner Act was to establish
contracts. What he always said was that his purpose was to make the
worker a free man, and that always went over well with the audiences.
He made fun of the company union, which he called the marionette of
the employer, and the dictator of the terms of the labor agreement.
He always argued, "All I am trying to do is make the worker a free
man." I don't think he emphasized the making of contracts; although
naturally, the right to organize and bargain collectively would be
meaningless if it didn't lead to contracts.
Another example that that was not his primary concern originally, or even in the second Wagner Act, if you want to call it that,
was that it specifically did not contain the employer's obligation to
bargain collectively and make a contract. It did not contain it because
that hadn't been our approach. Our approach was to make the
worker a free man and give him equality of bargaining power and let
him make his contract if he could. The Chairman of the nonstatutory
Board, Francis Biddle, came before the committee and introduced the
amendments that incorporated the obligation to bargain collectively.
That idea had some difficulty because the Board had to define when
you were sincerely bargaining collectively and when you weren't. In
any case, Biddle introduced that amendment. Senator Wagner,
although he hadn't had it in the original bill, never interposed objections to it, and it did in fact pass and became part of the law. But that
came from the Labor Board.95
CASEBEER: Can we talk about the addition of section 8(5), the
duty to bargain provision, to the four sections initially specified as
unfair labor practices? Was it thought that section 7 of the Act
95. J. GRoss, supra note 10, at 137.
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directly created an enforceable duty to bargain, or that such an
enforceable duty would not produce the optimal labor-management
relationship?
KEYSERLING: I think that if I had been asked, I would have
said, "Does the right to organize collective bargaining involve the
duty of the employer to organize the bargain collectively?" Or perhaps I would have said, "Is a refusal to bargain collectively on the
part of the employer a denial of the right of the worker to organize the
bargain collectively?" And I certainly would have answered with an
emphatic "Yes," because that would be the only answer I could give.
CASEBEER: Therefore section 8(1), preventing interference
with section 7, really encompassed all that was necessary to prevent
the unfair labor practice of the employer who refused to deal seriously
with the rights established?
KEYSERLING: I think the Biddle amendment merely specifically incorporated the actual intent. I could never have taken the
position that even after labor had been organized to bargain collectively, the employer could just say "I won't bargain with you," and
the enforcement of the right by labor could only be by force majeure;
in other words, a strike or some other method. Had I taken that position, I would have been saying that labor has to do exactly the same
things-go through the strike process to get the right recognized. So
it must have been my view, or Senator Wagner's view, that you
couldn't get purchasing power by organizing if you didn't get a contract, so that must have been implicit in the whole Act. We took the
position that bargaining collectively was implicit, but if you were
going to bargain collectively, the employer had to bargain.
CASEBEER: But you didn't see any particular cost to granting
that right expressly?
KEYSERLING: No, we never objected to it and I assume that
the decisions under the Wagner nonstatutory Board must have
included cases where the Board held that the employer had to make a
genuine effort to bargain collectively, because no seven men could
have held that if the employer refused to meet with workers, that
would not be an interference. So I think the Biddle amendment was a
refinement and specification of what the whole Act meant. They may
have discovered in their attempt to administer section 7(a) that an
important factor was the refusal of the employer to bargain
collectively.
CASEBEER: In the implications of the duty to bargain, what
was the intellectual process that went into deciding that the subject of
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collective bargaining should be wages, hours, and conditions of
employment? Was there a reason for the selection of those topics?
KEYSERLING: Because those were the big issues.
CASEBEER: Was it thought that the duty to bargain should be
limited to those issues?
KEYSERLING: No. We just concentrated on those issues
because that is what collective bargaining is all about. The issue of
supplementary benefits originated largely with the United Auto
Workers much later under Walter Reuther. Even the other types of
fringe benefits really developed considerably later. So at that time, the
whole nature of the labor contract was wages, hours, and working
conditions. After all, wages can be extended to include fringe benefits
as a form of wage, and other working conditions can include almost
anything. So it was really an all inclusive set of terms.
CASEBEER: But wages, hours, and conditions of employment
weren't necessarily thought to be terms of art that excluded topics of
bargaining.
KEYSERLING: Certainly not. I think those terms were
thought of as all inclusive. Working conditions and terms of employment included any term of employment, sick leave, vacations, or any
other employment terms.
CASEBEER: Did anyone think to include interests of labor that
were not necessarily thought of in terms of a wage term or any other
condition that could be treated as part of the wage exchanged for
labor? Would it have been a contemporary political issue to think
about conditions of employment as related to management of the
enterprise, or other kinds of decisions about profit sharing?
KEYSERLING: I don't think we considered that one way or
the other, and I don't think it entered our minds. I think that if we
had been asked at the time whether it included profit sharing, we
would have said no, simply as a matter of practical feasibility. In
addition, we would have been concerned about the effect profit sharing would have had upon the chances of the bill's passage if we had
said that this gave labor the right to demand a share in profits. No, I
don't think we intended to include that.
CASEBEER: In the section 9 unit determination decision, was
there a specific reason why the linkage should be made between the
unit for election purposes and the unit for bargaining purposes?
KEYSERLING: I think it was a practical matter that tied in
with the question of majority rule. I think the question of majority
rule was only a secondary concern in the Railway Labor Act. It was
a natural part of Senator Wagner's political thinking that unless you
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had majority rule, you had nothing. Without majority rule, you just
had the division of labor within itself that management could foster
and exacerbate. They had found that out. The Wagner Board had
enunciated the principle of majority rule, which is inseparable from
these other factors because that is the only way you can choose representatives and have a meeting.
CASEBEER: We were talking about the determination of the
bargaining unit in section 9 of the Act. The majority rule principle
demanded some way of setting an electoral unit. Was there any connection in your thinking between the unit picked for electing representatives, and the actual bargaining with employer groups?
KEYSERLING: If a unit were organized to select bargainers,
wouldn't the bargainers then represent that unit in dealing with the
employer?
CASEBEER: It might have been that the electoral unit might
have allowed the bargaining representative to determine which subgroups or whether the full group would bargain with either individual
employers or groups of employers.
KEYSERLING: I wouldn't be able to answer that question.
Evidently it was something that arose at the time in construction of
the administration of the Act by the statutory Board.
CASEBEER: Was there any pressure from the AFL in particular or any other organized labor group to allow the labor organizations, rather than the administrative Board, to define the intended or
targeted bargaining unit?
KEYSERLING: You are asking questions that presumably
arose when the Board was administering the Act. I wasn't there at
that time and wasn't following it very closely. It really doesn't relate
to the development of the statute.
CASEBEER: In the drafting of the statute, it was simply a natural assumption that the bargaining unit would follow directly from
the election of representatives. Wasn't there any discussion of that
feature?
KEYSERLING: The representatives would have to be elected
by someone, and I assume that they would represent the group that
elected them. That would just be my assumption. There were all
kinds of questions, such as determination of the units, the certification
of the units, the powers of the units, and resolving conflicts among the
units. All of these questions arose in the administration of the Act. I
didn't watch it very closely. In fact, I turned to other things after the
Act was passed. Although I maintained some interest in it, by that
time I was thoroughly engrossed in the housing bill.
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CASEBEER: In some of Senator Wagner's responses during the
Senate hearings, and in answering other Senators' questions on the
floor, Senator Wagner stated that the National Labor Relations Board
should be the decision maker over the appropriate electoral unit,
because a neutral party had to be the initial designator of the appropriate unit. Otherwise, if the unit were left in control of business, that
would mean the perpetuation of company unions by a different name.
For labor, it would create the possibility of jurisdictional disputes or
fragmentation in bargaining.9 6
KEYSERLING: That sounds logical.
CASEBEER: Was that a consideration that was simply a
response to the difficulties of getting union recognition despite the
paper guarantee of section 7(a)? Was it also a consideration of how
labor and management negotiations could best contribute to economic
stability?
KEYSERLING: I think it must have been both, because the
ultimate purpose was economic stability and harmonious labor
relations.
CASEBEER: Was it hoped that the collective bargaining strategy that would emerge from an enforceable right of union recognition
would lead to a larger bargaining unit or industry- or area-wide bargaining? Was that ever a consideration in the drafting?
KEYSERLING: We were aware of the problem of industrywide bargaining and may have favored it, but I don't think the Act
was designed to force or even to put pressures in that direction. The
industrial union itself, which ultimately resulted in the advent of the
CIO before it merged with the AFL, was designed to create a larger
bargaining unit than the craft unit system by including workers on
more levels. The Act did not foresee whether it was to extend from
the company or group of companies to the industry as a whole. As a
matter of fact, a good deal of the bargaining is now conducted on an
industry-wide basis, especially in the automobile and steel industries.
Even in the automobile industry, the units of the United Automobile Workers that work for Chrysler bargain for a wage agreement
with Chrysler that isn't necessarily identical to, nor even determinative of the bargaining with General Motors or Ford. So it really
hasn't gotten beyond company bargaining to industry bargaining, at
least not in those important instances.
CASEBEER: It wasn't necessarily something that was to be
96. 79 CONG. REC. 7565-74 (1935).
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encouraged by the National Labor Relations Board, but it wasn't necessarily to be interfered with either.
KEYSERLING: That's right. That's certainly true.
CASEBEER: How was the decision arrived at to limit the definition of employees who would be included in bargaining units, particularly the decision on agricultural workers?
KEYSERLING: That's an interesting story in itself. The Senator originally left out agricultural workers for purely political reasons.
The difficulty of getting the bill through the Senate with such a disproportionate representation of rural people, allied to management
and not to agricultural labor, would have increased beyond all reason
the odds against getting the Act passed.
During the consideration of the Act, Rex Tugwell's secretary
came over to see me and said that Tugwell and Wallace would like to
see the Act extended to include agricultural workers. I said I would
talk to the Senator about it. So I went to see Wagner and he was
rather thoughtful. He said that if Henry Wallace would write him a
letter asking that agricultural workers be included, he would include
them and make the fight for it. But if Wallace wasn't willing to fight
for it, he couldn't undertake it alone. I relayed that message and we
never heard from Tugwell about it again.9 7 Wallace was very careful.
He was not prepared to fight for the Wagner Act for agricultural
labor. Later on, I had similar requests when I was in the Housing
Agency. 98
VI.

IMPLEMENTATION

CASEBEER: That, for the most part, ends my questioning
97. Keyserling seemed disappointed at this lack of response:
This was another sidelight on Henry Wallace's record, despite his later
incarnations. I knew Henry Wallace very well. He was a wonderful man, very
educated, well meaning, and progressive. But as Secretary of Agriculture, he
necessarily performed as a Secretary might. He was entirely beholden to the
chairmen of the agricultural committees in the Senate and the House, who were
all big Southern landowners like Senator Smith and Congressman Bankhead,
who later became Speaker of the House and was the father of Tallulah Bankhead.
98. This disappointment was repeated:
Charlie [Charles F.] Brannan, who was at that time Under Secretary of
Agriculture, later became Secretary of Agriculture. He has remained one of my
very close friends, and I see him frequently. Brannan shared my interest in
having the low rent housing program extend to agricultural workers. I went to
see Henry Wallace about it, but I got nowhere with him, again because he was
afraid of the House and Senate committees on agriculture. Naturally, those
people wouldn't have wanted it, and were going to vote against him. In fact, they
fought the low rent housing and subsidized program in general, even though
agricultural workers were not included.
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about the different sections of the Act. You raised a point just now
that I am curious about. When the legislative battle had finished and
the Act had been adopted, was it simply the pressures of other business in the Senator's office, or was it also interests of yours, that led
you in directions other than further labor legislation?
KEYSERLING: First of all the preliminary question is the
extent to which Wagner was interested in the staffing, membership, or
administration of the Labor Board. Not long after it became a permanent body, there was intense pressure on him to intervene because the
Board had split badly between the more conservative group and the
others. This resulted in the non-reappointment of those I classify as
falling on the liberal side: John Madden and especially Ed Smith. I
wouldn't want to classify them as anything more than "liberal," even
though there were scandalous rumors that they were under the influence of Lee Pressman, the communist lawyer for Phil Murray, until
Murray finally got rid of him and got the communists out of the labor
movement. The Labor Board split up into the left group, which
included Ed Smith, but not so much Madden, a conservative man
who leaned toward the labor side because they were often on the right
side regarding decisions, nor John Carmody, who was on the more
conservative side. Roosevelt put Madden on the claims court and Bill
[William M.] Leiserson took his place. Bill Leiserson was a part of
the conservative group, and although he originally thought that company unions were a good idea, he was now violently against them
because of what they actually turned out to be. He provided great
support to us during the consideration of the bill on the company
union issue, and generally on the other provisions of the bill.
CASEBEER: How did the changing character of the membership on the Board and the staffing of the Board change the direction
of the Act?
KEYSERLING: We were talking about Wagner's interest.
Wagner was often asked to intervene when administrative troubles
occurred. However, he made a scrupulous point of not getting
involved in the administration of any agency whether he had created
it or not. For that reason, while it was true that Wagner could have
selected the three original members of the permanent Board, or at
least two of them, he kept his hands entirely off of that decision,
which was extraordinary. He didn't know Madden. He knew Smith
because Smith had been on the nonpermanent Board, but he had no
interest in him. He also knew John Carmody because John had been
a labor conciliator whom Wagner would call when he was Chairman
of the first nonpermanent Board. But he took no interest in the selec-
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tion of the membership, nor in the staffing. He had nothing to do
with the appointment of the general counsel.
I had wanted to be general counsel, and Wagner could have
forced it, but Madden objected on the ground that I was too young
and had no court experience. In fact, I had no real legal experience at
that time. I hadn't even been counsel to the Housing Agency yet, and
to take a young person who had never been in court and make him
general counsel to lead the fight before the courts to vindicate the Act,
was a legitimate point, not that I couldn't have done it just as well.
When Madden raised that point, Wagner said that if they were going
to appoint someone of my age like Tommy Emerson or Nat Witt as
general counsel, they had to appoint me. But if they chose to appoint
an older and more experienced man, he would not interfere. That is
exactly what happened when they appointed Charles Fahey, who
became one of my closest friends. Frances Biddle later selected Fahey
to become Solicitor General when Biddle was Attorney General, both
because Biddle had been interested in the Labor Board and because of
Fahey's record as general counsel.
It would have been a great misfortune for me if I had gotten that
job. I don't know what would have happened, but I wouldn't have
had the experience that I had the way it turned out. I couldn't have
had a job that was better for me than the job on the economic council
and the relationship with Truman as a member of his cabinet. So that
was a fortunate thing that happened to me, contrary to my wishes at
that time.
CASEBEER: Did you keep an interest in the operation of the
Board?
KEYSERLING: As I have said, I did not because I became
totally involved in the battle for the Housing Act, a two year battle
which was just as strenuous and just as difficult as the Wagner Act. I
could have watched it passively, but I couldn't have actively tried to
inspect or influence what they did because it was against Wagner's
policy. Wagner didn't want anybody in his office interfering with the
Board, because he wouldn't interfere with it himself as a matter of
principle. He said, "I don't want to get involved in the administration
of the executive departments." He said that if he got involved in that,
he wouldn't have time for anything else and they would be expecting
all kinds of things that he could not do. So he just kept his hands off.
Except, of course, he took the leadership in the fight against the
amendments to the Act. That was a different thing. They were trying
to destroy his product. It was not that he was interfering with the
administration; he was maintaining an interest in the statute.
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CASEBEER: When the Act passed, how was it received by
those who had been active in either labor or labor legislation? Did
you ever have any conversations with Lewis or Green, or other AFL
leaders after its passage?
KEYSERLING: They were jubilant about the Act and made
very active use of it. Labor membership increased tremendously,
multiplying about five times.
CASEBEER: How about academic people like Felix Frankfurter, who had been so involved in the injunction issue?
KEYSERLING: Frankfurter rather studiously avoided interfering in the operation of Wagner's office. However, he unconsciously
expressed his support. He wrote a wonderful letter to the Senator
about his speech, IndustrialDemocracy and IndustrialPeace,99 which
of course, I wrote, which traced the whole economic situation at that
time. I suppose in fairness to Frankfurter, he undoubtedly knew that
I was Wagner's only professional assistant and that I was very heavily
involved in everything that he did, including speech writing. So
Frankfurter had many reasons to be happy about my work, but I
never had many contacts with him. I really should have gotten in
touch with him and asked to come to see him when he was a Justice.
I could easily have done that, but I didn't.
CASEBEER: What about the general response of the law school
community? Was there academic criticism or support for the bill
either before or after its passage?
KEYSERLING: One of my most outstanding observations in
my work in Washington was how little interest the academic profession generally takes or how little they know about what is really going
on. Challenge magazine, which is an economics magazine, not long
ago had the slogan, "Economic laws are what the Congress says they
are," which was a new approach for economists. Generally speaking,
they didn't take much of an interest. Some of them took a specialized
interest and wrote articles about it that were readily available.
CASEBEER: Let me ask a question about other legislative programs that addressed labor issues. Was there anybody else in Congress from 1933 to 1935 who had a different concept or a different
substantive program for labor relations than Senator Wagner?
KEYSERLING: They didn't have different programs, but all of
them had different ideas. The twelve senators who voted against the
National Labor Relations Act had different ideas about labor relations and the protection of labor. But they didn't have programs. I
99. Wagner, IndustrialDemocracy and Industrial Peace, supra note 15.
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don't recall anybody who had a program. The only exception was
Senator LaFoilette, who ran a long investigation into espionage and
other antilabor practices. He was very helpful in securing passage of
the Wagner Act. But the strangest thing is that even he never introduced legislation. Likewise, the great Temporary National Economic
Committee, which conducted a very comprehensive investigation of
economic problems, never introduced a single piece of legislation.
Senator O'Mahoney was chairman. So when Senator Elbert Thomas
said to me, "Why don't some of the other Senators introduce legislation instead of Senator Wagner? It would go over better because he
seems to be doing it all and Frank Kent is stigmatizing him as a labor
advocate." In response, I said that he needed to introduce legislation
and so did everybody else. Wagner used to say to me, "Why the hell
do they keep on having more hearings? The problem has already been
developed, so let's do something about it." That is the way it was.
CASEBEER: What was Senator Wagner's attitude toward proposals for recovery that were connected to labor, like Senator Hugo
Black's "thirty hour" proposal?
KEYSERLING: The Senator was the sponsor of most of the
recovery legislation. He sponsored the initial $3.3 billion public
works bill which was in the original National Industrial Recovery
Act. He also sponsored the Emergency Relief Act" and the Civilian
Conservation Corps Act.' 0 ' He sponsored almost everything. He was
sponsor of the National Housing Act, °2 creating the FHA, which
was mainly a recovery Act. He sponsored the Homeowners Loan
Act, 10 3 which was a recovery Act. He monopolized almost all of the
legislation, partly because Roosevelt chose him to handle the legislation that came from the White House, such as the Homeowners Loan
Corporation Act, and in the other cases when the legislation
originated outside of the White House. I remember when Roosevelt
made a speech in favor of Wagner's reelection in 1938 when Wagner
ran for a third term. I was very active in the campaign. Roosevelt
began by saying that "people often talked about the Wagner Act, but
that there were so many Wagner Acts that I don't know which one to
talk about."
CASEBEER: Did the Senator oppose the thirty hour bill?
100. Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, ch. 30, § 2(b), 48 Stat. 55.
101. Civilian Conservation Corps Reforestation Relief Act, ch. 17, 48 Stat. 122 (1933),

repealed by Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 648 (1966).
102. Ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750 (1982 &
Supp. 11 1984)).
103. Ch. 64, 48 Stat. 123 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982 &
Supp. 11 1984)).
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KEYSERLING: The thirty hour week bill never came to a vote.
He opposed it in the sense that the provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act were designed to answer the thirty hour bill. He
never supported it. What he would have done had it come to a vote, I
just don't know. 1°
CASEBEER: In your view was that a misguided approach to
recovery?
KEYSERLING: Yes, because I didn't believe in sharing unemployment instead of creating jobs. The thirty hour bill was an attempt
to share unemployment by having a lot of people unemployed ten
hours per week instead of a smaller number of people unemployed full
time. My opposition to the shortened work week has gone much further. When I was working closely with Walter Reuther many years
later, when he was one of the main financial supporters of the Conference on Economic Progress, the labor movement started developing
support for a shorter work week, and Reuther asked me to help him
oppose it. He said he just didn't believe that the solution to the unemployment problem was shortening the work week. He said we ought
to have a shortening of the work week only when we came to prefer
more leisure rather than more work, and when we were productive
enough to justify that, and our production needs were more fully met.
But as an employment measure, he opposed it. Later, when we had so
many recessions and so much unemployment, the labor pressure for a
shorter work week became so insistent even within the CIO, and later
within the AFL-CIO, that Reuther stopped actively opposing it
because it was futile, but he never actively supported it.
CASEBEER: In your view, did recovery programs have to link
wage rates to productivity or production increases?
KEYSERLING: Yes. The wage rates should equal the productivity gains in real terms except in one case, and this is where I later
differed so strongly with the Heller Council. They started with the
formula that wage rates should equal productivity gains, but if productivity dropped to zero because you were in a recession, they also
said that wage rates should not be increased, because otherwise there
would be inflationary pressures. Keynes knew better, and even Hoover knew better because Hoover pleaded with business not to reduce
wage rates even during the Great Depression, because it would simply
aggravate the problem, but they didn't listen to him.
My own approach was that each factor in the economy should be
adjusted to the full-employment quotient. In other words, spending
104. Wagner did vote for the bill, although it never came to final consideration.
supra note 15, at 144.
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policy, tax policy, and wage policy should all be adjusted to a model
that I would call a national prosperity budget, or full-employment
budget. We should then strive to adjust each factor according to this
model. This is contrary to the recent and current practice, which I
have opposed so much, that adjusts everything downward because
something else is going down. In other words, if production is going
down and therefore revenues are less, and you slash public investment
programs to comport with the poor performance of the other sections,
that is not budgeting for a full economy. That is what I learned during World War II; you adjusted each component to the requirements
of a full economy.105

CASEBEER: So nothing in the powers of the National Labor
Relations Board was intended to restrict collective bargaining in order
to seek the highest possible wage rate for labor?
KEYSERLING: To the best of my knowledge, the National
Labor Relations Board was never intended under the Act to determine wage rates or hours, nor did it attempt to do so. It limited itself
to supporting a wholesome and clear atmosphere for collective bargaining. That was the philosophy of the Act. It was not a wage
board, and it was not an hours-of-work board. I presume in theory
105. Keyserling described the New Deal economics record, and fears for future policy:
Of course, more than just increased wage rates arising out of collective
bargaining were necessary. During the Depression, the break of the economic
recovery came a little later than the Wagner Act. That came in 1937. But labor
was still concerned. Unemployment was being brought down, but was still very
high, and remained very high until World War II, which created the utterly
wrong impression fomented by economists and others, that the New Deal did not
succeed in reducing unemployment until World War II. This is absolutely false.
In numbers and percentages, the reduction of unemployment was much greater
during the New Deal period than at any later time, despite much greater
difficulties, much less knowledge, and much fewer instruments. It was a unique
reduction of unemployment, and the only reason it didn't go down even further
was that in 1937, due to Roosevelt's innate conservatism and the pressures from
Secretary Morgenthau, and especially from the Congress, there was a very sharp
cutback in federal spending.
But in 1937 there was a sharp cutback in public spending because of these
forces, which Senator Wagner opposed. That brought about one of the sharpest
recessions that we have ever had. From 1937 through 1939, we really had a
depression within a depression. But even after that setback, which was not due
to the New Deal but to the departure from it, if you measured all the way from
1933 to 1939, the reduction in unemployment, measured on both a percentage
and an actual basis, was greater than at any subsequent time. A better record
was made then than at any later time. The record in recent years has been
absolutely fantastic. We still have six to seven percent unemployment after all
these years. Alvin Hansen used to say to me, that the thing he feared more than
anything else was that economists would come to accept higher and higher levels
of unemployment as being consistent with full employment. It is nothing but a
rationalization for failure.
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that if in the process of collective bargaining, labor proposed wages
that were outlandishly high, and the employer refused to go along, the
Board wouldn't have held that the employer was refusing to bargain
collectively. In fact, the Board did not, and under the Act wasn't
supposed to, evaluate bargaining in good faith based on whether the
parties were in agreement on the terms, but rather only whether they
were bargaining in good faith. Did they intend to reach an
agreement?
VII. DRAFTS
CASEBEER: Let me again shift away from the policies, the
intent, and the sections of the Act, to the process of writing and drafting the provisions. You said that particularly in constructing the final
version of the '35 Act that there was some building on past legislative
provisions like the Railway Labor Act, and section 7(a) of the NIRA.
Clearly, a lot of attention was paid to an independent and workable
administrative apparatus to overcome the enforcement problems of
the nonstatutory Boards. Was the actual drafting work, the design to
accomplish both the substantive goal and the administrative goal, a
lengthy process? Was it a process which Went through many drafts,
or was it a relatively straightforward problem?
KEYSERLING: It could be better answered by looking at the
drafts. There were many drafts." 6
CASEBEER: What were the influences on the changes from the
original drafts?
KEYSERLING: Both Senator Wagner and I were partially at
fault. If you are drafting a speech and nobody else has anything to do
with it, you redraft it and change it because you are not satisfied.
That was one of the reasons for the changes in the draft. Other
changes resulted from my discussions with the people that I have
mentioned already, whether on the nonstatutory Labor Board, in the
labor movement, or elsewhere.
CASEBEER: That is what I am really asking. Was the Senator
interested in particular language? Did he go over the wording of the
sections with you, or was he more interested in the general outcome
that was going to be produced in the end?
KEYSERLING: He didn't go over the details of the legislative
drafting. He knew that our thinking was generally the same and he
had confidence in the people that I was working with. He knew that I
106. There are eight drafts of the bill written prior to the submission of the Labor Disputes
Bill to committee in 1934 contained in the Papers of Leon Keyserling, supra note 73.
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was clearing matters with the AFL people. No, he didn't go into the
details of the drafting. However, he was a very good reader of language. He was interested in reading the drafts from the point of view
of whether they were clear, which is a very different thing from the
other question. He would frequently say, "It just isn't clear. Make it
clearer. What does it mean?"
CASEBEER: What about the interaction with the people that
you were consulting with? Did you have lengthy debates with your
friend Emerson?
KEYSERLING: We were in agreement to a very large extent. I
actually used Phil Levy more than any of the others. Phil came from
Columbia Law School and served on Biddle's staff, as well as on the
staff of the permanent Board. I asked him to prepare very long memoranda, which became part of the record. The man who wrote the
book, The New Deal Lawyers,"" made one mistake, which he was
happy to correct. After getting hold of all these memoranda by Levy,
he thought that Levy was more the originator of the Act. He didn't
realize that they were all memoranda that I had asked Levy for. In
effect, Levy was on my staff during this period. I thought so highly of
him that I recommended Levy as my successor when I left Wagner to
go with the Housing Agency. He became my successor and continued
there until he was drafted into the war effort.
CASEBEER: In the 1934 bill, the Labor Department took an
active interest in the location of the Board, and in the application of
unfair labor practices to labor organizations as well as employers.
Why did they drop, or at least not strongly push the same two points
on the '35 Act?
KEYSERLING: They pushed them as strongly as they could.
They just were defeated by Senator Wagner. In 1935, as I said, Secretary Perkins got Congressman Connery, chairman of the House committee, to report the bill out of committee, with the Board in the
Labor Department. Perkins, unlike Roosevelt, never opposed the bill.
When she testified on the bill, she supported it, not strongly, but she
supported it. But the insistent point in her testimony was that the
Board should be in the Labor Department. She just lost. She didn't
withdraw. Likewise, on the so-called Wyzanski bill, which Senator
Walsh put forward in 1934, they never changed their position. Wagner just withdrew the bill and put in a new one the next year. For one
reason or another, Wagner was able to force Walsh to go along with
107. P. IRONS, supra note 11, at 226.
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it. Besides, Wyzanski was in Europe that year attending meetings of
the International Labor Organization.
CASEBEER: So the Labor Department shifted its focus from
the Senate to the House. Was that because Walsh changed his mind?
KEYSERLING: No. They shifted their focus after the bill had
passed the Senate. It was after the Wagner bill passed the Senate in
1935 that Perkins prevailed on Connery to have the bill put the Board
in the Labor Department.
CASEBEER: But Walsh must have changed some of his
positions.
KEYSERLING: He changed them for whatever reason. In
1935 he went along with the revised Wagner bill.
CASEBEER: How was the decision made that Senator Wagner
would write the Senate report so that his office would be responsible
for the report accompanying the bill?
KEYSERLING: Well, that wasn't the situation in 1934. In
1934 Wyzanski wrote the report. The chairman of whatever committee it was would generally ask Wagner to write the report for his bill,
even if he wasn't on the committee. As I said before, I wrote the
report for Black on the housing bill. I wrote the report for Walsh on
the labor bill in 1935, and I also wrote the House report on the bill.
CASEBEER: Was it a normal course of events that the committee chairman would ask the sponsors, instead of their own office, to
write the report?
KEYSERLING: I don't know whether it was a general practice
overall, but it was true in Wagner's case as to the labor and housing
bills. We didn't write the report on the National Industrial Recovery
Act, but Wagner remained the sponsor of the bill. It didn't change in
that case because the bill was reported to the Finance Committee.
That was also true of the Social Security Act, which he introduced.
But the social security bill was not a Wagner product. The social
security bill was a product of the special committee that Roosevelt
appointed in 1935. But there again on the social security bill, Wagner
didn't write the report, but the bill was reported in the Senate as his
bill and he made the lead-off speech for it in the Senate and was in
charge of the debate. Except for Wyzanski's temporary take over of
Walsh, which had no ultimate effect, Wagner was in complete control
of the labor bill throughout the testimony, the reports, the bills, and
everything else.
CASEBEER: Was there any reason why the Labor Department
itself didn't develop an administration policy on labor-management
relations, collective bargaining, and strikes?
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KEYSERLING: I don't know the reason why, but they didn't.
Perhaps it was because Wagner had preempted the field, but for
whatever reason they didn't.
CASEBEER: They seemed to favor conciliation?
KEYSERLING: Yes, conciliation was favored under John Steelman, who was a conciliator to whom Wagner frequently turned for
help when he was under the temporary Board. Later, Steelman
became special assistant to President Truman, and a great rivalry
developed between him and Clark Clifford. Clifford was the man for
the liberals, such as Brannan, me, and the others, and Steelman was
the man for Sawyer, who was Secretary of Commerce, and Snyder,
who was Secretary of
the Treasury. Truman, however, always
08
decided on our side.1
I forgot one other important thing. One of the reasons that Wagner supported a strong and independent Board, although I think he
would have supported one anyway, was the extent to which Secretary
Perkins interfered with the operations of the nonstatutory Board
under Garrison and Biddle. She interfered with their staff appointments and tried to interfere in their policy decisions. This was quite a
problem with Biddle and Garrison. Of course, Wagner knew all
about that. That may have been one of the reasons he supported an
independent Board even though he didn't think that the Labor Board
should be in the Labor Department either.
Frankfurter, who taught administrative law at Harvard, felt very
strongly about the independent Board, and approved very much of
the dissenting reports that I wrote for Ramspeck and Marcantonio.
Wagner felt that even if these agencies ultimately should be absorbed
into the existing departments, a newly created Board could be much
more venturesome if it were independent, than if it were in one of the
departments. The Labor Board never would have established the record it did in the early years if it had been in the Labor Department.
CASEBEER: Was that consideration something that was
108. On Cabinet selections, Keyserling commented:
Snyder was much closer to him personally. Snyder was his closest personal
friend. Mrs. Snyder was a close friend of Mrs. Truman's, and their daughter
Drucy was Margaret Truman's closest friend. That went back to Missouri. But
when Snyder and I differed on a matter of economic policy, Truman always took
my side because he understood the function of the Council of Economic
Advisers. The other agencies were claimants for their constituencies, and the
Council was supposed to be an independent economic general staff. Truman
always took my side. He said that at that level, I was the greatest advocate that
he ever had around him, which was quite a compliment in view of the fact that
he had Acheson and Clifford, and I'm sure he didn't say the same thing to them.
That was just not Truman.
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important in the design of the administrative sections of the Wagner
Act? That is, the experience of the nonstatutory Boards was one in
which there were contrary policies in both the Labor Department and
the Justice Department?
KEYSERLING: I think the difference was that in the Justice
Department, the question was purely lawyerlike: Could they defend
themselves before the Supreme Court? °9 In the Labor Department,
however, it was mostly policy quarrels. When we wrote the administrative provisions of the Wagner Act, on which as I have said I got a
lot of help, we clearly wrote them with the assumption that the Board
would be independent. Had we written them with the assumption
that the Board would be in the Labor Department, we would have
had to define the role of the Secretary of Labor in the administrative
procedure to clarify what she did, and the extent to which her decisions affected what happened.
CASEBEER: You wanted both a judicial approach to the decision of unfair labor practices and a quick independent internal access
to the federal courts to enforce the orders?
KEYSERLING: Exactly. As Senator Wagner and I believed, a
quasi-judicial body, particularly in the early years of its life, should be
independent. It should really run its show.
CASEBEER: Beyond the theory of administrative practice, was
that related also to the specific context of labor-management relations,
that a strong signal needed to be sent, particularly to employers?
KEYSERLING: That may have had something to do with it.
To give another example, in 1937, when the Housing Act became law,
Secretary Ickes administered the public works provisions under title
II of the National Industrial Recovery Act. For some reason, Wagner never objected to having a department administer grants to the
states and localities for public works. He never reached that point.
When the Housing Act came up, Ickes said that he had had a housing
division under his Public Works Administration, and that they had
built something like twenty demonstration projects. When the Housing Act came up, Ickes insisted that the housing administration be
placed in the Interior Department. Wagner wanted an independent
housing administration. That resulted in quite a battle. When it came
up in the Senate, Ickes bribed a number of Senators by offering them
projects. He had hundreds of millions of dollars of projects to offer,
and the Senate ruled to put it in the Interior Department, which is
exactly the way it finally came out. But Wagner won that battle
109. P. IRONS, supra note 11, at 216-25.
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because Ickes wanted Mr. Gray, who was the head of the Housing
Division of Public Works, to be administrator of the Housing Authority. Wagner backed Nathan Strauss, and again there was quite a battle. Wagner went up to Hyde Park and got Roosevelt to appoint
Strauss. From the moment Strauss was appointed, Ickes announced
that even though it was in his department he would have absolutely
nothing to do with it. So we operated as an entirely independent
agency within the Interior Department, and I was general counsel.
Then a lot of other things happened. There were reorganizations. We got transferred to the Federal Works Agency when it was
still comprised of sixteen warring agencies. Roosevelt called on me
for a plan; or rather, he called on Sam Rosenman for a plan to
straighten this out. Rosenman talked to the two top people in each of
the sixteen agencies and went and told Roosevelt that I should draw
up a plan. So Roosevelt asked me to draw up a plan. I drafted Executive Order 9070, which took effect in February 1942. This order
created the National Housing Agency as a wartime agency responsible for war housing. The FHA and other agencies were constituent
units under it. I became general counsel to that agency. I went over
there rather than accept the position of administrator of the United
States Housing Authority. I remained with that job until I went on to
the Economic Council. So I wrote the Executive order that created
the National Housing Agency under the Housing Act of 1949,110 on
which I worked with Wagner and Senator Taft. It was the most comprehensive of all of the housing acts. The temporary wartime
National Housing Agency became the Housing and Home Finance
Agency, and later by Executive order, it became the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). In effect, as I once said to
Pat Harris when she was the head of Housing and Urban Development, "I really laid the bricks for this agency through Executive
Order 9070, and the Housing and Home Finance Agency."
Wagner maintained his position that the Housing Agency should
be independent, which it was in effect due to the circumstances that I
described. It remained independent until the National Housing
Agency was created under the Executive order.
CASEBEER: Did you and Senator Wagner sharply disagree
about any aspect of either of the Acts?
KEYSERLING: Senator Wagner and I never had a sharp disagreement on anything, except that sometimes he didn't like the drafts
of some of my speeches. But that was not a quarrel because I didn't
110. Ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1490 (1982 &
Supp. 11 1984)).
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have a vote on the decisions. 1 '
CASEBEER: Were there any aspects of the Act that you would
have favored including, which were modified from the original draft
for purely political reasons?
KEYSERLING: Hardly so. We didn't equivocate on the Act
and we really got what we wanted, which was amazing in view of all
the opposition and all the conflicting forces. That is a tribute to Senator Wagner.
VIII.

LEGACY

CASEBEER: Let me ask one last general question. In light of
the experience of fifty years under the Wagner Act, people like Lane
Kirkland have suggested that at least some unions could do better
without the Wagner Act. Do you think there are any reforms or
major changes which are now appropriate?
KEYSERLING: There is nothing wrong with the Act. It just
needs another President and a different kind of Board. I think Lane
Kirkland is just dead wrong on that, and a lot of the top labor people
have told me that he is altogether wrong in saying that labor would be
better off without the Wagner Act.
CASEBEER: Are there, in your opinion, any changes, particularly administrative changes, that would better fulfill the initial purposes of the Act?
KEYSERLING: It's a matter of different personnel-different
personnel in the White House, different personnel on the Board, and a
different person as general counsel to the Board, who is made almost
superior to the Board under the Taft-Hartley Act."1 2
111. On his relationship with Senator Wagner, Keyserling remembered:
In all of the years that I worked with Senator Wagner, there was only one time
he ever got angry with me that was entirely unreasonable. The story once came
out in the press that I had drafted the Housing Act. This enraged him. It was so
unreasonable because he had everybody working on the Act-twelve people and
me. Everyone interested knew that I had drafted the thing. This was nothing
unusual, but it just enraged him. He said, "Oh, so now you are the Senator."
But he got over it in an hour or so, and never raised the question again. But all
through the time I worked for him, I was extremely careful about not creating
the impression that I was sharing responsibility with him. He appreciated that. I
was so unlike some of the later people with Kennedy, who went around claiming
that they educated the President; that he knew nothing about economics, but
they taught him. If that had happened when I was with Truman, he'd have fired
me.
112. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)).
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CASEBEER: In your judgment, would that improve the ability
of labor to utilize the original tools effectively?
KEYSERLING: There's no question about it. Labor is responsible for its troubles in some respects. George Meany said that he was
never really interested in organizing more people. He said that labor
had enough people. But even at twenty million, organized labor is
only one-fifth of the work force. However, he was never very interested in more. That was one of the two tremendous differences
between Meany and Walter Reuther. The other was that they had
altogether different views on international policy. Although Reuther
was the one who had cleaned the communists out of the UAW,
Meany was more avowedly anticommunist. The previous UAW president, R.J. Thomas, came very close to being a communist. So
Reuther was just as clearly anticommunist in the labor movement as
anyone else. But he didn't go along with Meany on withdrawal from
the International Labor Office just because the Russians were in it.
Reuther was influenced by his principal adviser on international matters, who was avowedly a former communist, and was the strongest
anticommunist of all the communists who had "gotten religion" and
become anticommunist. Therefore, the AFL was at fault for failing to
organize more workers. They differed with Reuther on that. They
also differed on some matters of international policy, which was one
of the reasons Reuther got the auto workers out of the AFL-CIO.
CASEBEER: Was it difficult for the AFL to operate effectively
during the drafting of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and
later, the National Labor Relations Act, given their policy of avoiding
appeal to government power?
KEYSERLING: They changed that policy due to the Great
Depression. When I came to Washington, the AFL was officially
against unemployment insurance. William Green had a top advisor
named Florence Thorne. She was a big influence on him and she was
antigovernment, but that changed over when Meany came in and
when the Depression came. They became the most active supporters
of all of the legislation that we worked for: The Housing Act, the
Labor Relations Act, the NIRA, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
so forth.
IX.

ELABORATION ON DRAFTING AND DRAFTS

CASEBEER: I have some questions on some specific points that
arose from one of our previous talks. I want to start with some of the
personalities who were involved with you throughout the different
stages of the drafting process. I'm curious about the initial "summit
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meeting" in 1934 when Charlton Ogburn, the AFL people, Senator
Wagner, and some others were initially meeting to talk about the specifics of a labor bill." 3 I'm curious about how that meeting came to
pass, how it was set up, and its purpose.
KEYSERLING: In late 1933, Wagner told me he wanted a
labor court bill. I started work on what became the Wagner Act. I
don't recall the particular meeting that you are referring to. But it's
quite likely that Wagner had a meeting with people like Green, Warrum, or Ogburn to talk about his proposal for going ahead with the
labor bill. If so, the meeting would have been held in his office. Now,
I had many, many other meetings with both Warrum and Ogburn, so
I suppose that initial meeting would have involved a general statement by the Senator that he was interested in such legislation. He
also would have wanted to get their initial reactions, which of course
would have been warm and favorable.
CASEBEER: Did either Warrum or Ogburn have any specific
points that they wanted to include in the bill? Did they mention that
they wanted certain kinds of provisions?
KEYSERLING: No, they at no time took the initiative in doing
that. Of course, they commented upon the drafts of the bills that I
prepared, but they did not initiate details. They were interested in a
bill to vindicate section 7(a) and provide enforcement provisions for
it.
CASEBEER: They didn't care whether it should be an
independent agency or located in the Labor Department or a labor
court?
KEYSERLING: I don't recall any such brief, but they never
objected to the Senator's determination to have an independent
agency.
Now, I may not have mentioned to you that one of the reasons
the Senator was so strongly in favor of an independent agency,
although he would have been for it anyway, was that the Garrison
and Biddle Boards had a good deal of trouble with the Secretary of
Labor on all kinds of things, such as appointments, substance, and so
forth. Of course, the substance of things would have been Wyzanski's
ideas. That was one of the reasons they were so insistent upon an
113. In January 1934, Senator Wagner met with William Green, John L. Lewis, Henry
Warrum, Charles Wyzanski, .and Keyserling. I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 63.
Supporters of increased purchasing power as an anti-Depression policy connected with
this meeting, or Senator Wagner's period with the NRA and National Labor Board, include
John L. Lewis, Gerard Swope, Leo Wolman, Harold Moulton, and William Leiserson. See
Renshaw, supra note 19, at 220-21.
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independent board. These factors had contributed to Wagner's thinking, although I know he would have been in favor of a very independent board anyway.
CASEBEER: In the drafting of the '34 bill, did Milton Handler
have particular experiences from the first nonstatutory Board that he
thought were problems that needed to be drafted against; that an
independent agency, for example, would be able to better deal with
some of the issues?
KEYSERLING: Naturally, as I have said, I had extensive discussions and conferences with Milton Handler as counsel to the nonstatutory Board. He was involved in the process all along.
CASEBEER: One of his main concerns seems to have been the
use of elections to produce an exclusive representative.
KEYSERLING: That was because they had that kind of problem even in Wagner's time. It evolved out of the nonstatutory Board.
If they were going to have collective bargaining, they needed to have
representatives chosen for that purpose.
CASEBEER: In the drafting of the second bill when you were
working with a number of people who were on the staff of the Resolution 44 Board, the Garrison Board, did they express any frustration
with the Board's procedural mechanism?
KEYSERLING: Naturally. They had many frustrations. They
couldn't get Justice to enforce the law.
CASEBEER: Were there any particular cases that they were
most concerned about?
KEYSERLING: No, I don't remember any particular cases.
The only contact I had with that kind of thing was reviewed in Industrial Democracy and Industrial Peace,'14 where I talked in detail
about the patient efforts of the labor people to do this and do that.
The person that helped me most on the memoranda relating to that
was Phil Levy.
CASEBEER: He was particularly interested in the mechanics of
the administrative agency?
KEYSERLING: Yes, well, they were all interested. But Phil
was the person who did most of the detail work for me because I was
in a better position to ask him to do things, rather than Handler or
Magruder. I remember particularly how helpful his memoranda were
in connection with Industrial Democracy and IndustrialPeace.
CASEBEER: Was there ever a time when the AFL was at odds
114. Wagner, IndustrialDemocracy and Industrial Peace, supra note 15.
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with any of the people involved in the drafting process over the question of unfair labor practices against unions?
KEYSERLING: We did not have to put much of an effort in
convincing the other people on that issue because we were so strongly
against it. Senator Wagner frequently talked about that in his
speeches.
Now, there is one other thing that I should have mentioned. In
1934 or 1935, the nonstatutory Board went out on its own and drafted
a bill, in lieu of the Wagner bill. They had eager fingers. I don't
remember that it was substantially different, but those people had
their own ideas as to how to make the presentation. This was rather
unusual and rather uninformed. Wagner always had his bills drafted
from his own office-he never asked other people to draft bills. Biddle then invited Wagner over, and I went over with him. They
handed us copies of this alternative bill. Wagner took it politely. He
didn't mention to them how he felt about it, but the next day, on my
own initiative, I visited Biddle and explained to him that we didn't
operate that way. That was the end of that bill. This was not due to
differences of opinion. What I mean is that the lawyers over there,
Tommy Emerson and Nat Witt, just wanted to draft a bill. That is
natural, but it was not in accordance with the processes we operated
under.
CASEBEER: Were you and Emerson still living in the same
house at that time?
KEYSERLING: Yes. We had to be because we didn't leave that
house until late 1934 when he got married, and I went to live with
Emerson and his wife out in Virginia. He had a tennis court out
there. That's where Magruder and his wife used to come and play
with us regularly. That's a matter of interest but is of no significance
because nothing ever happened to that draft.
CASEBEER: I asked a number of questions about the AFL
which seemed by all accounts, to take a hands-off attitude on the specifics. Were there non-AFL unions that were more interested in the
drafting?
KEYSERLING: I don't recall that we dealt with non-AFL
unions.
CASEBEER: There's correspondence with the Newspaper
Guild.
KEYSERLING: That's a different thing. They were critical and
the correspondence reveals the nature of the relationship. They didn't
have any influence on us.
CASEBEER: The Newspaper Guild seemed to want direct
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enforcement of unfair labor practices in the courts rather than
through an administrative agency?
KEYSERLING: You mean through the Department of Justice?
CASEBEER: Through statutory crimes, basically.
KEYSERLING: There are a lot of different things they may
have wanted but we didn't honor their views very much.
CASEBEER: But you did consider the alternative of making
unfair labor practices direct violations of civil law for the purposes of
damages?..
KEYSERLING: No, we didn't do that. Well, we considered it
in the sense that we read what they gave us, but not seriously.
CASEBEER: They also wanted an unfair labor practice that
would have required businesses to open their books.
KEYSERLING: That was a very contentious issue. The chief
proponent of that issue in an entirely different connection was Walter
Reuther, but it was very controversial and we never got into it. It
went to the question of fair wages in terms of profits and other factors,
and because the Wagner Act didn't deal with the question of what
was a fair wage or what the wage should be, we didn't get into it at all.
We weren't going to confront the issue of opening books, although it
was a good idea. They should open their books. Walter Reuther
began to press that issue much later.
CASEBEER: The reason that I asked the question is the line
that you had in mind between preventing unfair labor practices in
order to permit collective bargaining and to equalize bargaining
power, as opposed to preventing unfair labor practices in order to
encourage specific agreements or to encourage a wider range of issues
being involved in collective bargaining.
KEYSERLING: The purpose of the Wagner Act, of course, was
to serve specific agreements because without specific agreements there
would be no meaningful collective bargaining. But as I said before,
we drew a close distinction between the Wagner Act as the basis for
assuring collective bargaining, and the contents of the bargaining. We
never went into the contents of the bargaining. The issue of opening
books, therefore, was not really an important issue for us because it
was directed toward what the wage should be, or what the employer
could afford to pay.
CASEBEER: So the bargaining process itself would set its own
agenda as to what issues would be addressed?
KEYSERLING: Yes.
115. I.

BERNSTEIN,

supra note 9, at 63.
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CASEBEER: Or what the contents of those deliberations would
be?
KEYSERLING: The Wagner Act was solely to promote, protect, and assure collective bargaining, and unionization in a sense. It
was as an entirely independent matter, not directly related to the Act,
that Wagner gave many talks in which he was very critical of the
Recovery Act codes on the ground that labor was falling behind on
the wage front.
CASEBEER: In section 13, where there is the guarantee of the
right to strike, there's a question of whether it was contemplated that
the right to strike would be limited by the collective bargaining process. Was there some specific reason for putting that residual guarantee of the right to strike in the Act?
KEYSERLING: There was a definite reason. First, because
Wagner was always strong for the right to strike on the ground that
without the right to strike, which was labor's ultimate weapon, they
really had no other weapon. That guarantee was a part of his thinking. It was particularly necessary because a lot of people made the
argument that because the government was giving labor the right to
bargain collectively, that was a substitute for the right to strike, which
was utterly wrong.
CASEBEER: It could be argued that the section 7 guarantee for
mutual aid and protection as a concerted activity would include a
guarantee of the right to strike.
KEYSERLING: We made that explicit.
CASEBEER: You wanted to make it explicit?
KEYSERLING: Yes, because some courts would have construed the opposite: that they had to exercise this right as a condition
precedent to the right to strike. We didn't want to interfere in any
way with that basic weapon. We never interfered with the right of the
employer to close his plant.
CASEBEER: Then the strike or the lockout weapons were to be
deployed in the judgment of each side to the collective bargaining?
KEYSERLING: Yes, although we didn't specifically guarantee
in the statute the right to lockout because we were dealing with
employee's rights. Employers still had plenty of rights.
CASEBEER: Was the issue of sitdown strikes or the use of
strikes during the course of the contract discussed?
KEYSERLING: Well, certainly, the explicit guarantee of the
right to strike didn't delimit it in any way. They could strike at any
time.
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CASEBEER: So that if there was an impasse, for example, over
the terms of the contractKEYSERLING: They could strike.
CASEBEER: It would simply be a matter of the collective bargaining that would go on not only in the formation of the agreement
but in its interpretations and in any reopening of negotiations?
KEYSERLING: They would still have the right to strike. But
without the explicit guarantee of section 13, they may well have developed, as a result of pressure on the part of employers, pressure on the
part of the media, or even through court decisions, some idea that
Congress had given labor something as an alternative to the right to
strike. This wasn't true at all. We did believe, correctly, that if the
Act succeeded in protecting the right to bargain collectively, it would
limit strikes based upon the failure to recognize the union bargaining,
a most dangerous and exacerbating type of strike. The Act reduced
the likelihood of that and other types of strikes by providing an avenue for collective bargaining. After the Act became effective with the
constitutional sanction of the Court, Wagner frequently used statistics
to show that the number of these strikes had been reduced.
CASEBEER: It was an effort to equalize the bargaining power
that would force both sides to a realistic understanding of their joint
interests, rather than in some way administratively force an agreement and maintain it?
KEYSERLING: No, there was no provision of the Act to force
an agreement. That would have been compulsory arbitration in a
form that both the Senator and labor were against.
CASEBEER: I wonder if I could read you a quotation from a
recent commentary that makes a point about the intent of the Act and
its legislative history. Professor Matthew Finken is describing one of
the early cases that arose under the Act, and the brief of the NLRB to
the Supreme Court:
Under the heading that the contract is 'irrelevant' to the
employer's duty to bargain, the Board asserted squarely that:
'[c]ollective bargaining may properly deal with a change in the
existing contract.'
The major difficulty with this position, as the company argued
in reply, was that it ignored the fact that the labor Act's protection
of bargaining was precisely to secure collective agreements. The
flouting of agreements made was, the company argued, inconsistent with the achievement of labor peace and industrial stability
. ... One comes away from the briefs and the case with the
impression that the Board was simply out-lawyered, for it marshalled no argument or authority to rebut the company's argu-
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ment, which was firmly rooted in the legislative history of the

Act. ' 16

And then he cited to the Senate report accompanying the bill in 1935,
which you wrote for Senator Wagner. I am wondering if that is a fair
interpretation of the intent of the Act?
KEYSERLING: Did the courts ever hold after the Act was in
effect that this was the case, that the collective bargaining demand
cannot deal with the alteration of an existing contract, or that a contract was sacred in the sense that you couldn't even raise the question
of changing a contract in the event that circumstances changed? We
never intended that.
CASEBEER: That was never the intent?
KEYSERLING: No. If he infers that that was the intent, I
think he is wrong. I don't see how it could be because there are many
situations when either party may want to honor the contract's
changed circumstances. Extreme increases in the price level and all
kinds of other factors might cause either party to want to reopen a
contract. The essence of a contract is that it can be reopened. It can't
be violated, but it can be reopened. We certainly never intended to
prevent that. If he says that the legislative intent was to prevent the
reopening of contracts, I don't see where he got that.
CASEBEER: Let me ask a couple of questions about the
changes in the drafts as they went along."' Relatively early on, I
think in the third draft in 1934, and all the way through the eighth
draft, there was a protection of the closed shop if it had been bargained for, but only on the condition that the closed shop did not
exclude minority groups or minorities of employees from union membership. Was that something that you or the Senator were interested
in but subsequently was dropped from the Act for some reason?
KEYSERLING: I could almost state categorically, as the actual
history of the Act, that nothing that we felt was important got
dropped. We had command throughout of what went into the Act.
CASEBEER: But this provision said that nothing in the Act
was meant to change the state law status or the permissibility of the
closed shop, providing only that a closed shop could not be with a
union that had exclusive membership requirements. That provision
116. Finkin, supra note 4, at 39-40 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Brief for National Labor
Relations Board at 31, NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 322 (1939)). But see Keyserling,
Why the Wagner Act?, supra note 36, at 17.
117. The first draft is dated January 31, 1934, and the second draft is dated February 19,
1934. No dates appear on drafts three through seven. The eighth draft is dated February 27,
1934.
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did not make it into the Act. There was some opposition to the Act
from people like Leonard Boudin, who felt that racial minorities
would be unprotected with a majority rule, exclusive representation
provision.
KEYSERLING: There have been and still are all kinds of questions as to the democracy of the unions, but we didn't intend to write
a statute reforming the unions or determining their practices. That
would have been a seamless web. I guess the changes that you refer to
just reflected further thinking on our part and undoubtedly comments
from other people, probably including some of the union people.
CASEBEER: That part of the draft also had another feature
that later did not make it into the Act. It was originally provided that
a closed shop agreement could only be reached if sixty percent of
those eligible to vote in the unit election chose that particular bargaining representative. This was later increased to seventy-five percent of
8
the potential membership. "
KEYSERLING: Then it was dropped.
CASEBEER: Yes. Was there some reason for the initial percentages and then the change?
KEYSERLING: I guess the only reason was that at the beginning we were very ambitious about doing a lot of things. We later
decided that the statute should not be complicated with such things.
The dropping of those provisions was consistent with the general philosophy underlying the Act. We were not attempting to rewrite the
practices of unions, or for that matter of employers, except on the sole
issue of the right to organize and bargain collectively.
CASEBEER: It would seem that setting limitations on the ability of the employer and employee to reach a closed shop agreement,
whether by quorum percentages or by other provisos, would be
attempting to set substantive terms of the contract, or parameters of
substantive terms.
KEYSERLING: That's right.
118. The draft reads:
No employer shall by interference, influence, restraint, favor, coercion, or in any
other manner attempt to abrogate or modify the right of employees guaranteed in
Section 10 . . . . Provided, that nothing in this Act shall prevent an employer
from requiring of a person seeking employment, as a condition of employment,
that such person belong to an organization, when such organization is composed
of at least 60 per cent of such employer's employees and imposes no inequitable
restrictions upon membership.
The Papers of Leon Keyserling, Draft No. 3, National Labor Relations Act, supra note 73, at
6-10.
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CASEBEER: That would have made it harder to defend in
other sections of the Act.
KEYSERLING: That's right. I find nothing puzzling about
provisions appearing in one stage and not in another. As I said, even
where you have sole authority, it is really like you are writing a speech
and then changing it ten times, and not saying things that you have to
say or saying things that you didn't mean. It's a wonder the degree of
similarity that the drafters maintain. Changes had to be made.
CASEBEER: In the eighth draft, which seemed to be the final
draft before the Act was introduced in 1934, there was a criminal
penalty for some of the unfair labor practices." 9 Why was it taken
away?
KEYSERLING: We in general took the view that the Labor
Board, supported by court decisions, was responsible for enforcement
and that we weren't getting into what kind of penalties and strategies
should be used in securing enforcement. We felt that putting the Act
on the statute books, having a Board to enforce it, and the recourse of
the Board to the courts for enforcement, didn't make it encumbent
upon us to prescribe penalties and means of enforcement. Another
reason was that we couldn't envisage just what circumstances would
arise or what would be an appropriate or inappropriate means of
enforcement.
CASEBEER: So while you wanted a tight administrative practice, you wanted the substantive regulations to evolve almost as a
common law of the Labor Board?
KEYSERLING: It's really a part of the Senator's philosophy
that he didn't want to get involved with the administration of the Act.
CASEBEER: He didn't want to have to relegislate continually.
KEYSERLING: That's right.
CASEBEER: In the drafts, continuing well into the last drafts
before the submission of the bill, the original Board membership was
to be divided. Within the eighth draft, a representative of employers
and a representative of employees, and then three neutrals were to
make up the five person Board. That provision was then dropped.'
KEYSERLING: We dropped that because we didn't want the
119. The draft made unfair labor practice a misdemeanor as follows:
Any unfair labor practice that has led or tends to lead to a labor dispute that
might burden commerce, or obstruct. the 'free flow of commerce, or dissipate
natural resources, or affect the general welfare, shall be a misdemeanor and upon
conviction thereof an offender shall be fined not more than $500 for each offense,
and each day such violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense.
Id., Draft No. 8, at 12.
120. Id. at 15.
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Board to be divided ab initio; and we wanted purely public responsibility. After all, if we had set up a Board with the obvious kind of
division that was involved, it would have been like a lot of boards and
advisory groups, including many of the advisory groups to the President, such as the Mobilization Board, which failed for that reason.
We didn't think that an administrative board of a quasi-judicial
nature should be a divided ab initio anymore than the Supreme Court
should be chosen by picking members on a representative basis.
I have on other occasions, although Wagner wasn't involved in
it, begun to be critical of the Federal Reserve Board. I objected to the
Board's composition, as many people did, and recommended that the
Board include members of agriculture, business, and labor. But that
was partly because the Federal Reserve Board was never a public
body in the same sense that the Labor Board was. The Federal
Reserve Board was always a banking board. The Open Market Committee, which was a very important part of the Fed, was drawn from
the chief officers of various federal reserve banks, and people
appointed to the Board have been almost entirely banking and business people. There had never been any labor people appointed to the
Federal Reserve Board, and I have at times made recommendations
to Congressmen. The Federal Reserve Board should be a more representative Board so that the interests of various groups would be considered in determination of monetary policy. But that was a different
kind of question.
CASEBEER: Was it a Labor Department suggestion that the
Board be representational?
KEYSERLING: Not that I recall. After all, it was their idea
that the Board would, in reality, be the Secretary of Labor.
CASEBEER: There was also a section early on, on mediation
and arbitration. 12'
KEYSERLING: That was taken out, yes.
CASEBEER: Were those originally Labor Department suggestions? It seemed to be their approach to labor-management disputes.
KEYSERLING: No. I think in the original drafts we put that
in to cover the waterfront, but they were taken out.
CASEBEER: The final elimination was in the original late
drafts, a provision to prevent courts from enjoining investigations or
proceedings of the Board, which was then removed from the final
22
Act. 1
121. Id. at 30.
122. This provision stated, "No court shall have any jurisdiction to enjoin the Board or an
examiner from taking proceedings and holding hearings under a complaint." Id. at 28.
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KEYSERLING: I think a lot of those removals were in the
interest of clarity and simplification.
CASEBEER: Is that one you might have liked to have left in, in
light of the early federal district court treatment of the Board's
decisions?
KEYSERLING: Without making excessive claims, if we had
wanted it to stay in, it would have stayed in. This was just the history
of the Act, it is not a matter of prideful claiming. We got what we
wanted. Again, I have to say for the purpose of emphasis that differences between a first and an eighth draft are only natural and are to be
expected. The changes in substance and language were made on the
basis of more reflection and more discussion.
CASEBEER: There are some memoranda and correspondence
from the Labor Department that were related to Labor Department
changes. The Labor Department wanted the Board to be in the Labor
Department.
KEYSERLING: That was a big fight all the way through to the
end.
CASEBEER: They also suggested the tripartite Board, and they
suggested that the NLRB should stay its hand if other NIRA boards
were established in specific industries, such as the automobile
industry.
KEYSERLING: We were against that. That was the President's approach, except that his approach didn't include the Labor
Board.
CASEBEER: Was it ever feared that there would have to be
some compromise on any of those points in order to get the bill passed
and have the administration's support?
KEYSERLING: I don't recall important compromises on that
basis at any stage. The one outstanding case, which I have already
told you about, was the inclusion of farm labor. Wagner said he was
willing to put it in the bill if Wallace asked for it, but that never happened. That was a compromise. He certainly felt that they should be
protected, but he just saw in the Senate and its almost dominant rural
composition at the time, a farm interest composition-the chairmen
of most of the committees were controlled by southerners-that putting in farm labor would be too much to carry, although he would
have been willing to take the risk if the Department of Agriculture
was committed to supporting it.
CASEBEER: These suggestions to put the Board in the Labor
Department, or to make the NLRB contingent on other NIRA
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boards, in fact in the proposal that the Labor Board have only concurrent jurisdiction with other boardsKEYSERLING: We were entirely against that. After all, what
we were trying to get rid of were the industrial boards.
CASEBEER: Were these suggestions from the staff of the
Department? Was there ever a point where Frances Perkins became
directly involved in asking for any other changes?
KEYSERLING: I wouldn't know about the extent to which the
staff of the Secretary of Labor had responsibility for the decisions of
the Labor Department. I would have no way of knowing that. It is
true that the specific recommendations came from the staff, but I'm
sure that Wyzanski must have cleared them with the Secretary of
Labor.
CASEBEER: So Wyzanski would have been the person that
made the suggestions on behalf of the Labor Department?
KEYSERLING: Yes.
CASEBEER: Do you recall, aside from wanting the Board to be
in the Labor Department, whether there was any other part of the bill
in which Wyzanski himself was personally interested?
KEYSERLING: That is reflected in what I call the Walsh bill,
although it was still the Wagner bill. There were many differences
between the bills.
CASEBEER: The limitation of tle declaration of purpose?
KEYSERLING: Yes, but there were also many substantive differences, and the reflection of that was the Walsh report, which
Wyzanski wrote. It began with a declaration of what the bill does not
do. Now, some of that was a true answer to our opposition's claim
that the bill did what it didn't do. Other parts of it would make sure
that the board didn't do some of the things that it should do and that
the Wagner draft provided. That long beginning of the report on
what the bill does not do is very revealing.
X.

THEORY

CASEBEER: There is a question that I'd like to ask that I don't
know how to frame. It really doesn't go to the language of the bill or
the specific unfair labor practices that were drafted, and it's not on the
economic philosophy behind the Act. It's more on the legal philosophy. It's a product of the sense that I get from your answers to a
whole series of questions, and I think it's in some ways capsulized by
the different approaches between the Wagner bill and the Walsh substitute bill. It's also reflected in speeches given by Senator Wagner in
both this period and somewhat later. It's about having to rethink the
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role of law. It strikes me that the Wyzanski approach was one that
you were quite opposed to because it attempted to carve out the narrowest use of law-to restrain practices-the narrowest restraint of
employer practices that would then allow labor some additional freedom in which to operate. Essentially, that bill was directed to a narrow restraint of specific practices. Was it your influence on the
Senator, or was it the Senator's own background, which led him or
led you to think more in terms of an affirmative attempt to strengthen
the power of organized labor?
KEYSERLING: It was very hard for me to delineate between
what the Senator felt and what I felt. I can only say that in a general
way, the reason we got along, and the reason I could be effective, was
that broadly speaking, we were in agreement. Second, on the more
detailed aspects, he relied greatly on my judgment. It was very hard
for me to say just where I ended and he began..
I recall that the Senator used to go to New York from time to
time. His buddies in New York were people like Al Smith and a man
named Surrogate Foley. They were all conservatives, and sometimes
he would come back from New York very worried, and maybe he
found it difficult at times to get me to change my position. I remember this happened one time when he came back, and Al Smith convinced him that my view on the preamble issue was incorrect. He saw
that it was correct when it was spelled out to him just what that
would mean in the courts.
CASEBEER: The article, Planning in Place of Restraint,123 captured some of what I was trying to get at.
KEYSERLING: That was an article arising out of the National
Industrial Recovery Act struggle, not the labor struggle, but it also
was a part of the Tugwell philosophy, which I had imbibed. He was
strong for centralized planning.
CASEBEER: In it there's a paragraph that reads:
It may seem paradoxical that the gospel of freedom for business enterprise nurtured a legal system which indulged solely in
restraints and prohibitions. But this was inevitably the case. You
could not define the terms of free competition. You could not regulate laissez-faire. You could not schematize planlessness. You
could merely outlaw practices which were deemed to interfere with
the inordinate play of enterprise. 124
KEYSERLING: I guess the purple pen got away with me on
that. I can see what it meant. I think it was essentially right, that
123. Wagner, Planning in Place of Restraint, supra note 15.
124. Id. at 396.
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once you were committed to the doctrine of laissez-faire it surely prescribed what the government and the courts could attempt.
CASEBEER: It seems to me that that creates two ways of reading the Wagner Act. One way of reading the Wagner Act is that it is
a stronger version of the Walsh substitute bill. It is just reading the
unfair labor practices as governmental interventions in collective bargaining to restrain certain practices. Another way to read the Wagner
Act is one that would emphasize the planning function, that the point
of preventing the antilabor practices would not simply prevent such
practices, but would free up the possibility of equalized collective bargaining power leading to a limitation of industrial strife, and also the
freedom of the working man to have some control over conditions.
KEYSERLING: In a sense that the opposition did not realize,
the Wagner Act was in some ways a very conservative statute,
because it says that there are a lot of things that the government
ought not to decide. We should permit labor and business to decide
them. There's one Wagner speech where he said something to the
effect that everyone is a leaf born of revived industry and rehabilitated
labor, and that totalitarian governments make some attempts that we
reject. A lot of it was really quite conservative. It was much less a
planning statute than the ideas embodied in Planning in Place of
Restraint. The National Industrial Recovery Act, with the codes
under the aegis of government, business, and labor, was much more in
the nature of centralized planning than the Wagner Act. Of course,
12 6
the Employment Act of 1946125 and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act
are much more oriented to government planning because they didn't
say that wages should be left to the efforts of revived industry and
rehabilitated labor. They didn't call for direct controls but they did
call for the government to set appropriate wage, price, and profit policies quantitatively to bring about economic equilibrium and a proper
balance between investment and consumption. So the Employment
Act and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act are much more radical, if you
want to use that term, than the Wagner Act.
CASEBEER: Radical in the sense of government intervention?
KEYSERLING: Exactly.
CASEBEER: Into market process?
KEYSERLING: Although the Senator was somewhat ambiva125. Ch. 33, 60 Stat. 23 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1024 (1982)).
126. Full Employment and Balanced Growth (Humphrey-Hawkins) Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3152 (1982 & Supp. II
1984)).
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lent on that, maybe because he was a German or for some other reason, he was pretty supportive of planning.
CASEBEER: But it wasn't thought that the result of equalized
bargaining power would interfere with coordination. It would make
it easier by removing some side issues, and also by allowing cooperation of labor-management interests.
KEYSERLING: The Employment Act and the Hawkins Act
are more advanced than the Wagner Act. But if the Employment Act
and the Hawkins Act were implemented, you would still need the
protections afforded by the Wagner Act in a way that you don't have
now.
CASEBEER: In the drafting of the Employment Act, was any
of the impetus for that Act reflective of any disappointment over the
ability of labor and management?
KEYSERLING: No, I don't think so. I think the impetus for
that Act was based largely on the basic thrust of my 1944 essay." 7
But the impetus for that Act was really the intent to avoid after
World War II what had happened after World War I, and what happened in 1929. You know most of the economists were strongly arguing that there would be eight million unemployed right after the war.
One of my articles in the New York Times contests that proposition.
But that didn't rest entirely upon the idea of what the Employment
Act would do. It rested upon measures taken by the government during the war to ease the transition.
CASEBEER: I suppose that I should ask if you can think of
questions that I should have asked but didn't?
KEYSERLING: Oh, you've asked every question, and as I said
originally there is no such thing as an unfair question, it's only the
answers that can be unfair.
CASEBEER: Thank you, Mr. Keyserling.

127. L.
(1944).
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